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ABSTRACT
In many branches of the economy, including transportation, lodging, and more
recently cloud computing, users can reserve resources in advance. Although advance
reservations are gaining popularity, little is known about the strategic behavior of
customers facing the decision whether to reserve a resource in advance or not.
Making an advance reservation can reduce the waiting time or the probability of
not getting service, but it is usually associated with an additional cost. To evaluate
this trade-off, we develop a game-theoretic framework, called advance reservation
games, that helps in reasoning about the strategic behavior of customers in systems
that allow advance reservations. Using this framework, we analyze several advance
reservation models, in the context of slotted loss queues and waiting queues. The
analysis of the economic equilibria, from the provider perspective, yields several key
insights, including: (i) If customers have no a-priori information about the availability
of servers, then only customers granted service should be charged a reservation fee; (ii)
Informing customers about the exact number of available servers is less profitable than
only informing them that servers are available; (iii) In many cases, the reservation fee
v
that leads to the equilibrium with maximum possible profit leads to other equilibria,
including one resulting with no profit; (iv) If the game repeats many times and
customers update their strategy after observing actions of other customers at previous
stage, then the system converges to an equilibrium where no one makes an advance
reservation, if such an equilibrium exists. Else, the system cycles and yields positive
profit to the provider
Finally, we study the impact of information sharing in M/M/1 queues with strate-
gic customers. We analyze the intuitive policy of sharing the queue length with cus-
tomers when it is small and hiding it when it is large. We prove that, from the
provider perspective, such a policy is never optimal. That is, either always sharing
the queue length or always hiding it maximizes the average number of customers
joining the queue.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
Advance reservation (AR) services form a pillar of the economy. They are widely
deployed in the industries of transportation (e.g., for reserving airplane and train
tickets), lodging (e.g., for booking hotel rooms), and health care (e.g., for schedul-
ing medical appointments). AR is also gaining popularity in communication net-
works (Guok et al., 2006; Charbonneau and Vokkarane, 2012) and cloud computing
(Sotomayor et al., 2009; Xie et al., 2012; Niu et al., 2012). The rise of the shared
economy expands the applications of AR to new fields such as shared cars (Bardhi
and Eckhardt, 2012) and shared parking spaces (Geng and Cassandras, 2012).
Supporting AR benefits the service provider since knowledge about future de-
mand can improve resource management and quality-of-service (Charbonneau and
Vokkarane, 2012). Customers are motivated to reserve in advance, since such a reser-
vation decreases their expected waiting time or their probability of not getting service.
A large portion of the existing research of advance reservations focuses on algo-
rithmic aspects, such as scheduling and routing (Gue´rin and Orda, 2000; Cohen et al.,
2009; Fazlollahi and Starobinski, 2015). Yet, in services supporting AR, it is often
up to the customers to decide whether to make a reservation in advance. Hence,
understanding the strategic behavior of customers in systems that support AR is a
fundamental problem.
When designing a system that allows advance reservations, the service provider
1
2controls several parameters such as:
• The AR fee (price);
• The charging scheme;
• The information shared with customers.
In practice, services that allow advance reservations often use different parameters.
Yet, the impact of these parameters on the decisions of customers and on the perfor-
mance of the system is not well understood.
In this dissertation, we introduce a game-theoretic framework, called Advance
Reservation (AR) games, that helps in reasoning about the strategic behavior of
customers in systems supporting advance reservations. Throughout the dissertation,
we use this framework to evaluate how different policies and prices, established by a
service provider, affect the strategic behavior of customers and, in turn, the economic
outcomes of different queueing systems.
Queueing systems are typically divided into two main types. The first type is wait-
ing queues. In such queues, customers wait for service. Examples include emergency
rooms, banks, or cloud resources. Reserving resources in advance in such systems
decreases the expected waiting time. The second type is loss queues. In such queues,
customers that encounter a busy system (i.e., all servers are busy) leave the queue
without being served (e.q., it is assumed that alternative services exist). For example,
consider hotel rooms or car rentals. Reserving resources in advance in such systems
decreases the probability of not getting service (also known as blocking probability).
In this dissertation, we use the AR games framework to study both types of queues.
Note that throughout the dissertation, we refer to a service provider as a “she” and
to a customer as a “he”.
3In Chapters 3 and 4, we study the behavior of customers in a slotted loss queue
with N servers that supports AR. The demand for service follows a general discrete
distribution. We assume that customers differ by how much time in advance they
realize that service is required (we refer to the realization point as the arrival time).
One of our goals is to capture the impact of the customers’ arrival times on their
strategic behavior. As shown throughout the dissertation, at equilibrium, customers
that arrive early tend to reserve in advance in contrast to customers that arrive late.
Upon realizing that service is required, customers can either make advance reser-
vation, or defer their decisions and request service on the spot. Making AR decreases
the probability of being blocked, but bears an additional reservation cost. The AR
cost may be a fee set by the provider (common in buying tickets for sport and enter-
tainment events), the time or resources required for making the reservation (consider
the case where making reservation requires making a phone call or physical presence),
or the cost of financing advance payment (common when buying air tickets).
In Chapter 3, we consider a setting in which information about availability of
servers is not shared with the customers. Under this setting, customers may make
AR request but not get service. We study two versions of this game. In the first
version, customers that try to reserve a server in advance but fail do not bear the
reservation costs. For example, assume that the reservation cost corresponds to the
financial cost of an advance payment. If a reservation is not made, this cost is spared.
In the second version, we assume that the cost of reservation is applied to all customers
attempting making AR. For example, consider a customer that waits in line to buy
a ticket for a show only to find out at the end that the show is sold out. In this case,
the reservation cost corresponds to the time spent waiting, and this cost is applied
whether service is provided or not.
We determine the equilibrium structures of those two games. We show that,
4at equilibrium, the strategy followed by all customers has a threshold form, where
only customers with arrival time smaller than some threshold make AR. We refer
to an equilibrium with threshold zero as a none-make-AR equilibrium and to an
equilibrium with threshold between 0 and 1 as a some-make-AR equilibrium. In the
former equilibrium, it is guaranteed that none of the customers will make AR, while
in the latter equilibrium, due to the stochastic nature of the problem, the number of
reservations is a random variable. We show that the equilibrium is not necessarily
unique and in some situations a game can have both some-make-AR and none-make-
AR equilibria.
We next assume that the AR cost is a fee charged by the provider, who can
decide whether to charge the fee from all customers attempting AR or only from
those granted service. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes of those two policies,
we show that charging a fee from all customers attempting to make AR, including
those not granted service, is never optimal.
After showing that charging AR fee only from customers granted service is prefer-
able, another question arises: What is the AR fee that maximizes the providers
expected revenue from AR fees? The answer to this question turns out to be more
complicated. We show that the fee which leads to the equilibrium with the maxi-
mum revenue may also lead to an equilibrium with no revenue. Therefore, in order
to properly set the AR fee, the provider should consider both the fee yielding the
maximum possible revenue and the fee yielding the maximum guaranteed revenue.
For this purpose, we introduce the concept of price of conservatism (PoC), which
corresponds to the ratio of the maximum possible revenue to the maximum guaran-
teed revenue. We assume that the demand follows a Poisson distribution and derive
the price of conservatism in different settings. First, we analyze the case of a single
server, where we prove that PoC = 1 (i.e., no loss). Next, we conduct the analysis of a
5many-server system and prove that the price of conservatism can be arbitrarily high.
This situation occurs when the system is slightly overloaded. We note that since AR
games are zero-sum games, the social welfare (i.e., the total payoff of all players in
the game, including the provider) is not affected by the decisions of the provider and
customers. Therefore, the price of anarchy (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999)
in such games always equals one. In contrast, the price of conservatism measures the
loss of profit from the viewpoint of the provider.
In Chapter 4, we use the framework of AR games to explore the impact of sharing
information about server availability with customers. In recent years, several works
used game-theoretic tools to study the impact of information on the decision whether
to join a queue or to balk. For examples, see (Guo and Zipkin, 2007; Hassin, 2007).
Those papers show that providing additional information (besides the queue param-
eters) is beneficial in some cases, while in other cases it can hurt either the provider
revenue or the social welfare. In this dissertation, we aim to determine how different
information sharing policies impact the decision of customers whether to make AR
or not.
A provider, aiming to maximize the number of advance reservations, can adopt
several information sharing policies. For example, she may share with customers
exact information about the number of available servers. This practice is common
in entertainment services, where customers are allowed to choose their seats and
observe the exact number of available seats before making the reservation (e.g., using
Ticketmaster reservation services1). Another option is to hide information about the
number of available servers and only to inform customers if servers are available or not.
This policy is common with airlines such as Delta Airlines which allows customers to
1See www.ticketmaster.com, accessed on 06/09/2016.
6choose their seats but only after buying their tickets2. The provider may also choose
a middle ground solution where information about the number of available servers
is shared, but only when a few servers remain available. This policy is implemented
in lodging websites, such as Booking.com, that alert potential customers when five
rooms or less are left3.
To evaluate the impact of information on the decisions of customers, we consider
the following set-up: customers first make a reservation inquiry and receive informa-
tion about the number of available servers. If no servers are available, they leave the
system with no gain or loss. Otherwise, they decide whether to make AR or not.
Making AR guarantees service but is associated with an additional cost.
First, we study a binary-information-game. In this version of the game, when
customers make an inquiry, they are only informed whether servers are available or
not. We show that this game has the same outcome as the first version of games with
no-information sharing.
Next, we study a full-information game. In this game, customers observe the exact
number of available servers. Therefore, their decisions depend on both their arrival
times and the number of available servers. We show that, at equilibrium, customers
follow a threshold strategy as in the previous games. However, a threshold strategy,
in this game, consists of N thresholds instead of one. We also show that this game
has a unique equilibrium. High AR costs lead to a none-make-AR equilibrium, while
low AR costs lead to a some-make-AR equilibrium.
We then consider a partial-information game. In this game, the provider informs
customers about the number of available servers only if this number falls below a
certain value. We assume that customers that are not informed realize that the
2See www.delta.com, accessed on 06/09/2016.
3See www.booking.com, accessed on 06/09/2016
7number of available servers is greater than that threshold and take this fact under
consideration upon making their decisions. We show that, in this game, the same
types of equilibria exist (i.e., none-make-AR and some-make-AR). However, the game
may have multiple equilibria.
Informing customers about the (exact) number of available servers leads to a trade-
off. On the one hand, customers that observe that all or almost all servers are available
are less likely to make a reservation (compared to a system that does not share
availability information). On the other hand, customers that observe that only a few
servers are available are more likely to make a reservation. To evaluate this trade-off
we use simulations. We show that, on average, the number of reservations decreases as
more information is provided to the customers. More specifically, the full-information
policy yields the lowest number of reservations. In the partial-information policies,
the number of customers making advance reservation increases as the threshold is
lowered, and the greatest number of reservations is achieved when no information at
all is provided.
In Chapter 5, we switch our focus from loss queues to waiting queues. Many
services, such as health care, banking and cloud computing, combine both first-come-
first-served (FCFS) scheduling policy and advance reservations. The motivation to
make reservations in advance in such queues is no longer to decrease or eliminate the
probability of not getting service, but to decrease the waiting time.
We assume that the time axis is divided into two time periods: reservations period
and service period. This restriction simplifies the analysis and is common in the
literature on advance reservations (Virtamo, 1992; Yessad et al., 2007; Syed et al.,
2008). During the reservation period, each customer realizes that he will need service
at a specific future time point. Upon realizing that, they decide whether to make
a reservation or not. Since customers are assumed to be strategic, they will make
8reservations only if it reduces their expected cost which consists of the reservation
cost (if making a reservation) and the cost of waiting.
We derive the equilibrium structure of the game and show that, as in the loss
queue, two possible types of equilibria prevail. In one equilibrium, none of the cus-
tomers makes AR. In the second equilibrium customers that realize early enough that
they will need future service make AR.
We show that if the utilization of the queue (i.e., the ratio between the arrival
rate and the service rate) is smaller than 0.5, the game has a unique equilibrium.
Low AR costs lead to a some-make-AR equilibrium, while high AR costs lead to a
none-make-AR equilibrium. If the utilization is greater than 0.5, a middle range of
AR costs also exists. An AR cost belonging to that range leads to three equilibria,
including none-make-AR and two some-make-AR. For this model, we derive a closed
form terms for the critical values of AR cost that determines which equilibria prevail.
Assuming that the AR cost is a fee charged by the service provider, we next
analyze the game from the prospective of a provider aiming to maximize her revenue
from AR fees. We show that if the utilization of the queue is greater than 2/3, then
the maximizing fee leads to multiple equilibria. Thus, charging that fee may lead to
the highest possible revenue but also to no revenue.
The AR games analyzed so far assume that all customers follow an equilibrium
strategy. To relax this assumption, we study, in Chapter 6, a dynamic version of the
game, in which customers initially follow an arbitrary threshold strategy. Our goal is
to find whether the system converges to an equilibrium or cycles. If it converges and
multiple equilibria exist, we aim to find to which equilibrium the system converges.
We use best response dynamics and distinguish between strategy-learning and
action-learning. In strategy-learning, customers obtain information about strategies
adopted at previous steps, while in action-learning, customers estimate the previous
9strategies by obtaining information about the actions taken at previous steps. Our
analysis shows that starting with any initial belief about customers behavior (i) Under
strategy-learning, the system always converges to an equilibrium; (ii) Under action-
learning, convergence is not guaranteed and if convergence occurs, it can only be to
a none-make-AR equilibrium; (iii) If the equilibrium is unique, more customers, on
average, make reservations under action-learning than under strategy-learning. Those
results are valid for both waiting queues and loss queues with no information sharing.
In Chapter 7, we study the impact of information sharing in M/M/1 queues with
strategic customers that need to decide whether to join the queue or to balk. The
literature on the strategic behavior of customers in M/M/1 queues is traditionally
divided into the classical observable and unobservable queues. In the former case
(Naor, 1969), customers are informed about the current queue length before deciding
whether to join or balk. In the latter case (Edelson and Hilderbrand, 1975), customers
make their decisions based on statistical information (e.g., the queue parameters). In
both cases, customers behave strategically and join the queue only if their expected
waiting cost is smaller than the reward obtained upon being served.
The goal of our work is to find out whether there are situations where the service
provider can increase her revenue by combining those two frameworks. In particu-
lar, we are interested in studying policies where the provider shares information with
some customers and hides it from others, depending on the actual queue length. We
assume that the service provider has a fixed income from each customer that joins the
queue. Thus, in order to maximize the revenue, the provider should maximize the ef-
fective arrival rate, which is the rate of customers that join the queue, or equivalently,
minimize the idle period of the system.
We compare between the outcomes of the following three policies: (i) always
inform customers about the queue length; (ii) never inform customers about the
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queue length; (iii) inform customers based on a threshold policy in which queue
length information is provided when the queue length is below the specified threshold
and is hidden otherwise. After finding the equilibrium structure of the third policy,
we prove that although that policy seems intuitive, either sharing information with
all customers or hiding information from all customers always yields greater expected
revenue.
In summary, in this dissertation we:
1. Develop a stochastic game-theoretic framework that helps in reasoning about
the strategic behavior of customers in loss queues and waiting queues that
support advance reservations.
2. Analyze the impact of pricing on the decisions of customers and how those
decisions impact the revenue of the service provider. The analysis includes
both equilibrium outcomes and the outcomes of dynamic games that repeat
many times.
3. Evaluate the impact of several information sharing policies on the decisions of
strategic customers whether to make advance reservation or not in a loss queue
and whether to join or not a waiting queue.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide
relevant background on game theory and queueing theory and survey related work.
In Chapter 3, we formally define AR games in loss queues and study two versions of
the game with no information sharing. In Chapter 4, we study three versions of the
game, each one with a different information sharing policy. In Chapter 5, we define
and study AR games in waiting queues. In Chapter 6, we study dynamic versions
of AR games. In Chapter 7, we study the impact of information on M/M/1 queues.
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Finally, in Chapter 8, we conclude the dissertation and provide directions for future
work.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we first review concepts of game theory and queueing theory related
to this dissertation. We then review related work on applying game theory to queues,
and relevant literature in the areas of advance reservations and learning.
2.1 Game Theory
Game theory is the mathematical study of the interaction among independent, strate-
gic and rational players (customers in this dissertation). It is rooted in the seminal
book “Theory of games and economic behavior” (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1947) and has been applied to a wide range of fields including economics, political
science, biology, psychology and engineering.
A game consists of players, the action space of these players, the outcomes of these
actions and the payoffs which result from these outcomes. Players may be of different
types and also have different information about the state of the system. Due to those
differences, players may have different preferences for the same outcome of a game.
A payoff is a numerical value that represents the utility of a player. Given player i,
and two outcomes A and B, if the payoff function Ui(·) satisfies Ui(A) < Ui(B), then
player i prefers B over A.
The action space is the set of actions a player can take. Once each player chooses
12
13
an action (each player may have a different action set to choose from), the game has
an outcome. Given an outcome, each player can compute its payoff, which reflects
the utility of each player for that outcome.
A pure strategy is a mapping of any situation a player can face into an action
from his action space. A mixed strategy is a mapping that assigns a probability to
each action. A Nash equilibrium is a balanced state, in which none of the users
has any incentive to deviate from his chosen strategy after observing the strategies
chosen by the other users. Naturally, equilibrium strategies are those of interest. A
Nash equilibrium may not be unique. Although other types of equilibria exist in the
literature, throughout this dissertation, any equilibrium refers to a Nash equilibrium.
An equilibrium is said to be a symmetric equilibrium if, under that equilibrium, all
players follow the same strategy. Such a strategy maps the space of all possible
situations players can face into an action (pure strategy) or a set of probabilities
(mixed strategy).
Typically, the number of players in a game is known by all players. However, in
many applications, uncertainty about the number of participants is a crucial element.
For example, when a customer decides whether to make an advance reservation, he
usually does not know how many other customers seek service at the same time. To
model such situations, one can treat the number of players as a random variable.
In such games, it is usually assumed that the players know the distribution of that
random variable. A seminal work on games with a random number of players is per-
formed in (Myerson, 1998) which introduces Poisson games. In that paper, Myerson
shows that if and only if the number of players is Poisson distributed with parameter
λ, then the number of other players, as seen by a player who does not count himself,
is also Poisson distributed with the same parameter λ.
In this dissertation, we focus on mechanism design, which is an engineering ap-
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proach to game theory. The goal is to design mechanisms and policies that optimize
desired objectives, under the assumption that all players follow an equilibrium strat-
egy. Mechanism design approach was first introduced in (Hurwicz, 1973) and is widely
used in several fields such as auctions (Cramton et al., 2006), scheduling (Heydenreich
et al., 2007) and communication networks (Srivastava et al., 2005).
2.2 Queueing Theory
Queueing theory is rooted in Erlang’s seminal work (Erlang, 1909), which developed
mathematical models to describe the Copenhagen telephone exchange. Queueing
theory has applications in telecommunication, public transportation, call centers and
hospitals. In this section, we briefly describe queueing models that are relevant to
this dissertation.
A queueing system has several properties which can be described by Kendall’s
notation (Kendall, 1953) which is a common notation to classify queueing systems.
With this notation, a queue is described by the four factors A/S/c/K, where A
denotes the inter-arrival distribution, S denotes the service distribution, c denotes
the number of servers and K is the capacity of the queue.
A queue with capacity equal to the number of servers is called a loss queue. In
such a queue, customers that cannot be served at their desired service time leave the
system. Throughout the dissertation, we assume that those customers do not make
another trial (a common assumption made in the literature of loss queues for the sake
of tractability (Ross, 1995)).
A queue whose size is greater than the number of servers is called a waiting
queue. In such a queue, customers that cannot be served upon arrival wait for service
(unless the queue is full). The capacity of the queue can be finite or infinite. In this
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dissertation, we only consider waiting queues of infinite capacity.
We consider two waiting queues: M/M/1 and M/D/1. In the former queue, both
the inter-arrival time and the service time follow independent Exponential distribu-
tions. The letter M stand for Markovian or memoryless, while the number 1 stands
for one server. In the M/D/1 queue, the service rate is a constant (D stands for de-
terministic). We follow the standard convention of not specifying the queue capacity
when it is infinite.
The dynamic evolution of many queueing systems can be modeled using Markov
processes, which are stochastic processes with Markovian property. We say that a
stochastic process is Markovian if the conditional probability distribution of future
states of the process depends only on the present state, and not on past states or
events.
2.3 Queueing Games
Queueing games is the study of a queueing system under the assumption that cus-
tomers are strategic. That is, the decisions of customers are not only influenced by
prices and policies set by providers but also by their beliefs about the decisions of
other customers. Typically, in a queueing game, each customer needs to make one
specific decision such as to join the queue or to balk, to buy priority or not, and
so on. The main objective when studying a queueing game is to find how strategic
customers respond to different system’s parameters and, in turn, how their decisions
impact the throughput of the system and/or the social welfare.
The application of game theory to analyze the strategic behavior of customers in
queues was pioneered by (Naor, 1969). In that paper, the author considers an M/M/1
queue where customers observe the queue length and then decide whether to join or
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balk. Follow-up works analyze the behavior of customers in different M/M/1 queue-
ing systems. For example, (Edelson and Hilderbrand, 1975) analyze an unobservable
M/M/1 queue, where customers decide whether to join or balk without knowing the
queue length. (Balachandran, 1972) analyzes an observable M/M/1 queue with pri-
orities, where customers decide on a payment and accordingly priorities are assigned.
Over the years, research on queuing games branched to other types of queueing
systems. For example, (Haviv et al., 2010) analyze an unobservable M/M/N/N (i.e.,
a loss queue with N servers) that is initially empty and customers decide whether
to join or balk based on their arrival time. (Altman and Shimkin, 1998) analyze an
observable processor sharing system, where customers decide whether or not to join
after observing the number of customers in the system. (Jain et al., 2011) introduce
concert queueing games, where N customers, interested in early service with minimal
wait, choose their arrival time into a system with a specific opening time. (Haviv
and Roughgarden, 2007) analyze an unobservable system with non-identical servers,
where customers aim to minimize their waiting time and select a server accordingly.
In recent years, research on the impact of information in queueing games has
emerged. (Hassin and Roet-Green, 2011) give examples of queueing systems pro-
viding on-line queue length information, including occupancy of emergency rooms in
hospitals, voting locations, security gates at international airports, and amusements
parks. (Shone et al., 2013) compare between the performance of observable and unob-
servable M/M/1 queues and find the conditions under which the joining rates of the
observable queue and unobservable queue are equal,. (Hassin, 2007) also studies the
information impact on an M/M/1 queue but considers different kinds of information
such as the current service rate or the current quality of service (it is assumed that
both parameters may change overtime). The authors show that in some cases it is
preferable to share information and in other cases it is preferable to hide it.
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For a comprehensive review of queueing game, see (Hassin and Haviv, 2003) and
(Hassin, 2016).
2.4 Advance Reservations
Queueing systems and communication networks that support advance reservations
have extensively been researched. Most of the research focuses on performance eval-
uation and algorithmic aspects of AR systems. For example, (Smith et al., 2000)
suggest a scheduling model that supports AR and evaluate several performance met-
rics. (Kaushik et al., 2006) suggest an AR model with flexible time window and show
that this model has a lower blocking probability and a higher utilization than a model
without window. (Gue´rin and Orda, 2000) analyze the effect of AR on the complexity
of path selection. (Virtamo, 1992) evaluates the impact of advance reservations on
server utilization. (Buyya et al., 2009) report a simulation-based comparison between
different payment mechanisms. (Cohen et al., 2009) propose algorithms for network
routing that support advance channel reservations. For a survey of the field, see
(Charbonneau and Vokkarane, 2012).
Advance reservation models have been also studied in the field of revenue manage-
ment. One of the first works in this field was conducted by (Liberman and Yechiali,
1978) which analyze a hotel reservation system where overbooking is allowed and
the goal is to find the optimal overbooking level. (Reiman and Wang, 2008) pro-
pose an admission control strategy for a reservation system with different classes of
customers. (Bertsimas and Shioda, 2003) propose a policy for accepting/rejecting
restaurant reservations. (Nasiry and Popescu, 2012) assume that customers have un-
certain valuations and they need to decide whether to purchase in advance or not
before their valuation is realized. The provider, aiming to maximize the revenue, can
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set different prices for advance sell and spot sell. None of this prior work considers
the strategic behavior of customers, namely, that decisions of customers are not only
influenced by prices and policies set by providers but also by their beliefs about the
decisions of other customers.
2.5 Learning Models
The concept of learning an equilibrium is rooted in Cournot’s duopoly model (Cournot,
1897) and has been extensively researched since. In Cournot’s model there are N firms
and each one simultaneously sets a quantity to produce. The market price is set at a
level such that demand equals the total quantity produced by all firms. The process
repeats many times. At each step, all firms observe the quantities produced by other
firms, and then each one sets a new quantity, naively assuming that all other firms will
not change their quantity. Cournot shows that the game converges to an equilibrium.
Furthermore, he shows that as the number of firms increases the price decreases and
eventually converges to the cost of production (i.e., the profit converges to zero).
Traditionally, learning models are used for fixed-player games (the same players
participate at each iteration) with a static environment, see, for instance, (Lakshmi-
varahan, 1981; Fudenberg, 1998; Milgrom and Roberts, 1991). In recent years, more
papers have focused on learning under stochastic settings. For example, in (Liu and
van Ryzin, 2011) customers choose between buying a product at full price or waiting
for a discount period. Decisions are made based on observing past capacities. (Alt-
man and Shimkin, 1998) analyze a processor sharing model. In this model, customers
choose between joining or balking after observing the performance history. (Zohar
et al., 2002) present a model of abandonment from unobservable queues. The decision
is based on the expected waiting time which is formed through accumulated experi-
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ence. (Fu and van der Schaar, 2009) assume that the same set of players participate
in a bid for wireless resources at each stage. However, the number of packets that
need to be transmitted at each iteration is a random variable.
Different learning models differ by their learning rule. A learning rule defines
what kind of information players gain and how they use it. In this dissertation, we
focus on best response dynamics. According to this rule, which is rooted in Cournot’s
work, players observe the most recent actions and assume that those actions will
be repeated in the next step. Another popular learning rule is fictitious play which
assumes that, at each iteration, players observe the actions made in all previous steps
and they best-respond to the empirical frequency of observed actions. This rule was
suggested by (Brown, 1951). In contrast, (Littman, 1994) and (Tan, 1993) assume
that players only observe their own payoffs and learn by trail-and-error. This learning
rule is known as reinforcement learning.
We conclude that both advance reservations and queueing games have been stud-
ied extensively in the past twenty years. However, to our knowledge, applying game-
theoretic tools to queueing systems that support advance reservations, was not done
before, except for (Oh and Su, 2012). In that paper, the authors suggest policies
to mitigate the problem of no-show in restaurants: to punish no-shows by charging
fees and to encourage show-ups by giving discounts.. In this dissertation, we fo-
cus on determining optimal policies that maximize the number of customers making
reservations and the revenue from reservation fees in a game-theoretic setting.
Chapter 3
Advance Reservation Games
In this chapter, we consider a slotted loss queue that allows customers to reserve
resources in advance. We assume that the provider does not share any information
about availability of servers. We first provide a detailed description of the model
under consideration. Next, we find the equilibrium structure under the assumption
that AR cost is applied only to served customers and when the AR cost is applied to
all customers that make AR. Then, we compare between the outcomes of those two
versions, assuming that the AR cost is a fee charged by the provider. Finally, we aim
to determine which fee maximizes the revenue from AR fees.
3.1 Model Description
First, we describe the assumptions that are common to both models:
1. The system consists of N servers.
2. The service time axis is slotted. That is, in each slot, customers are served from
the beginning till the end of the slot.
3. The demand, which represents the number of customers that request service
in a specific slot (each customer requests one server) is a random variable,
denoted by D. Customers that do not get service in a given slot do not make
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another trial (a common assumption in the literature of loss queues (Ross,
1995)). Thus, the demand in each slot is independent of the history and follows
a general probability distribution PD, supported in [a, b], where 0 ≤ a < N
and N < b ≤ ∞ (i.e, the demand has a positive probability of being smaller,
equal, or larger than the number of servers). The distribution PD is public
information.
4. The customers of each slot differ by the time elapsing between considering mak-
ing AR (i.e, realizing that service will be needed in that future slot) and the
slot starting time. We refer to this time interval as the arrival time. The arrival
times of all customers are independent and identically distributed random vari-
ables, supported in R+, with cumulative distribution function (CDF) denoted
F (·).
5. Each customer chooses one of two actions: make AR or not make AR, denoted
AR and AR′ respectively.
6. If the demand for a slot is larger than N , the servers are allocated to the first N
customers that made AR. If fewer than N customers made AR, the remaining
servers are arbitrarily allocated between the customers that did not make AR.
7. The customers and the provider know the number of servers N and statistical
information on the system (i.e., the distribution of the demand and the arrival
times).
8. Making reservation is associated with a fixed reservation cost C. All the cus-
tomers have the same utility U from the service. Without loss of generality, we
set U = 1.
Figure 3·1 illustrates the model
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Figure 3·1: Slotted system with two servers. The demand for each
slot is independent. The demand for slots 1, 2 and 3, is respectively 3,
2 and 4.
- Make AR Not make AR
Model Served Not served Served Not served
1 1− C 0 1 0
2 1− C −C 1 0
Table 3.1: Payoff summary.
The two models analyzed in this chapter differ in their reservation mechanisms as
follows:
1. No-information model 1: customers have no information regarding the avail-
ability of servers at the time of reservation. If a customer makes an AR request,
he is then informed whether a server will be allocated at the requested slot or
not. In the first case, the reservation cost is applied. In the second case, the
customer leaves the system with no gain or cost.
2. No-information model 2: as in the first model, customers have no infor-
mation regarding the availability of servers at the time of reservation. In this
model, however, the reservation cost is applied on each customer that makes an
AR request.
The possible payoffs of the two models are summarized in Table 3.1.
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3.2 Equilibria Analysis
3.2.1 Classification of the equilibria
We analyze the two models as non-cooperative games where each player (customer)
aims to maximize his payoff. Since the demand for the different slots are identical
and independent (i.i.d) random variables, the analysis of a single slot is sufficient for
analyzing the game. Any cost greater or equal to one has a trivial result where none
of the customers makes AR. Zero cost or a negative cost have the trivial result of all
customers making AR. Hence, in our analysis, we consider only costs between zero
and one (i.e., 0 < C < 1).
First, we note that the demand seen by a customer may be different from that
seen by an external observer (the provider, for instance). Indeed, the fact that a
customer seeks service in a given time slot affects his estimation of the number of
other customers seeking service in that time slot. On the one hand, a customer is
more likely to fall in a slot with large demand than in one with small demand. On the
other hand, he must exclude himself. This phenomenon is known as the discrete case
of the waiting time paradox (or residual life paradox ). We define D˜ as the number of
customers seen by a customer beside himself. The probability distribution function
(PDF) of D˜ is known to be (Avineri, 2004):
P
(
D˜ = j
)
= P (D = j + 1)
(j + 1)
E[D]
. (3.1)
The following lemma states that each customer makes a decision at his arrival
time.
Lemma 1. For all customers, making AR at the arrival time yields at least the same
payoff as making AR later on.
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Figure 3·2: Example of a realization of the demand in a given slot.
The service starts at arrival time 1. As customers have smaller (nor-
malized) arrival times, they have the opportunity to reserve a server
earlier.
Proof. In both models, if a customer makes AR when all servers are already reserved,
his payoff will be the same as if making AR later on (0 in the first model and −C in
the second model). If a customer makes AR when there is at least one free server,
his payoff will be 1− C. If he makes a reservation at a later point, his payoff will be
the same if there is still at least one free server. If there is no more server available,
his payoff will be zero in the first model and negative in the second model.
Given an arrival time γ, we set t , F (γ) and refer to it as the normalized arrival
time. Due to the probability integral transformation theorem (Dodge, 2006, p. 320),
we know that the normalized arrival time is a random variable, uniformly distributed
in [0, 1], where 1 is the service start time. Note that F (γ) is also the average fraction
of customers with arrival time smaller than γ. Since we are only interested in the
normalized arrival time, for brevity, we henceforth refer it to it as arrival time. Fig. 3·2
illustrates the new notion of arrival time.
For each game, we define a strategy function σ : t → [0, 1], which represents the
probability that a tagged customer with arrival time t ∈ [0, 1] makes AR. Since we
consider only symmetric equilibria, all customers follow the same strategy function.
Through conditioning, given that there are k other customers with arrival times
t1, . . . , tk that follow strategy σ, the tagged customer can find his probability of getting
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service (we denote that event by S) for each action he chooses. His probability to get
service, when choosing action A ∈ {AR,AR′} is
P (S|t,A, σ) = P
(
D˜<N
)
+
∞∑
k=N
P
(
D˜=k
) 1∫
t1=0
· · ·
1∫
tk=0
P (S|t,A, k, t1, . . . , tk, σ) dt1 · · · dtk.
(3.2)
The first term in (3.2) is the probability that the number of customers (beside the
tagged customer) is smaller than N . In this case, all customers get service, regardless
of their decisions. The second term is the weighted sum of the probabilities of getting
service when the number of customers (beside the tagged customer) is at least N . In
this case, the probability that the tagged customer gets service depends on his action
and on the strategy followed by the other customers and their arrival times (note that
the PDF of the random variable tj equals 1, for each j ∈ {1, .., k}). As shown in the
sequel, deriving an explicit expression for P (S|t,A, k, t1, . . . , tk, σ) is not required for
the equilibria analysis.
Given the model and strategy function followed by all other customers, one can
express the expected payoff, denoted Uσ (t,A), for each action A by multiplying
P (S|t,A, σ) and 1−P (S|t,A, σ) with the relevant payoffs, as summarized in Table 3.1.
In the first model, the expected payoffs are:
Uσ (t, AR) = P (S|t, AR, σ) · (1− C) + (1− P (S|t, AR, σ)) · 0 (3.3)
and
Uσ
(
t, AR′
)
= P
(
S|t, AR′, σ) · 1 + (1− P (S|t, AR′, σ)) · 0. (3.4)
In the second model, the expected payoffs are:
Uσ (t, AR) = P (S|t, AR, σ) (1− C) + (1− P (S|t, AR, σ)) (−C) (3.5)
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and
Uσ
(
t, AR′
)
= P
(
S|t, AR′, σ) · 1 + (1− P (S|t, AR′, σ)) · 0. (3.6)
At equilibrium, each customer chooses an action that maximizes his expected payoff.
Thus, we define an equilibrium strategy (i.e., a strategy that leads to equilibrium) as
follows.
Definition 1. Strategy σ is an equilibrium strategy if the following holds for any
arrival time t ∈ [0, 1]:
1. If σ (t) = 0 then Uσ (t, AR) ≤ Uσ (t, AR′).
2. If 0 < σ (t) < 1 then Uσ (t, AR) = Uσ (t, AR
′).
3. If σ (t) = 1 then Uσ (t, AR) ≥ Uσ (t, AR′).
That is, at equilibrium, a customer chooses the action AR′, only if he is (weakly)
better off not making AR; he randomizes his action, only if he is indifferent between
the two outcomes; and he chooses the action AR, only if he is (weakly) better off
making AR.
Next, we show that at equilibrium all customers follow the same threshold strategy,
defined below.
Definition 2. A threshold strategy has the following structure:
σ (t) =
{
0 if t > τ
1 if t ≤ τ.
where τ is a threshold value in the interval [0, 1).
Theoretically, the game could have infinite number of equilibria. For example,
suppose that σ(t) = 0 and (1 − C)P(S|t, AR, σ) = P(S|t, AR′, σ), for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
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(i.e., all customers choose AR′ and they are indifferent between the two actions). In
this case, σ is an equilibrium strategy. But
σ(t) =
{
1 if t = 0.5,
0 otherwise,
is also an equilibrium strategy, since the probability that a customer will arrive exactly
at 0.5 is zero. In practice, in both equilibria all customers choose AR′. In our analysis,
we wish to ignore such degenerate cases. For this purpose, we assume the following:
Assumption 1. At equilibrium, given an arrival time t = t1, if σ(t1) = x, then there
is a non-zero measure interval T1 such that t1 ∈ T1 and σ(t) = x for any t ∈ T1.
Lemma 2. In the no-information models, at equilibrium, all customers follow a
threshold strategy.
Proof. Consider a tagged customer with arrival time t and assume that the rest of
the customers follow a strategy function σ. Since information is not shared with
the customers, all customers that do not make AR have the same estimate of their
probability of service. More formally, let D˜AR be the number of reservations. Then,
the probability of service if not making AR is
P(S|D˜= d˜, D˜AR= d˜AR) =

1 if d˜ < N,
N−d˜AR
d˜+1−d˜AR if d˜ ≥ N and d˜AR < N,
0 otherwise.
(3.7)
Thus, Uσ (t, AR
′) does not depend on t. For brevity, we denote the expected payoff
of not making AR by β. From Lemma 1, we know that the expected payoff when
making AR Uσ (t, AR) is a non-increasing function of t. Hence, the two expected
payoffs can intersect at most once.
If Uσ (t, AR) < β for all t ∈ [0, 1], then σ is an equilibrium strategy only if none of
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the customers makes AR (i.e., it is a threshold strategy with τ = 0). If Uσ (t, AR) > β
for all t ∈ [0, 1], then σ is an equilibrium strategy only if all customers make AR (i.e.,
it is a threshold strategy with τ = 1). However, if all customers make AR, a customer
with arrival time 1− has the same probability to get service with and without AR.
Thus, he is better off not making AR. Therefore, an equilibrium where all customers
make AR cannot exist.
Finally, if the two expected payoff functions intersect, they can either intersect
at a single point t0 or along an interval [t1, t2]. In the first case, Uσ (t, AR) > β for
all t < t0 and Uσ (t, AR) < β for all t > t0. Thus, in this case, σ is an equilibrium
strategy only if it is a threshold strategy with τ = t0.
In the second case, Uσ (t, AR) has the same value for all t ∈ [t1, t2], which can
only happen if σ(t) = 0,∀t ∈ [t1, t2] (by Assumption 1, we ignore the case of σ (t) 6= 0
over a measure zero subset of [t1, t2]). Since none of the customers make AR in the
interval [t1, t2], and since Uσ (t, AR) > β for all t < t1 and Uσ (t, AR) < β for all
t > t2, we conclude that σ is an equilibrium strategy only if it is a threshold strategy
with τ = t1.
After showing that a threshold strategy is the only possible equilibrium strategy,
we distinguish between two types of equilibria.
Definition 3. None-make-AR is an equilibrium in which all customers follow a
threshold strategy with threshold τe = 0.
Definition 4. Some-make-AR is an equilibrium in which all customers follow a
threshold strategy with threshold τe ∈ (0, 1).
Using the results obtained so far, we find next the equilibria structure for each
model separately.
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3.2.2 Equilibria structure
In this section, we show that different ranges of costs lead to different equilibria. The
following theorem summarizes the main results.
Theorem 1. For each model i = 1, 2, there exist quantities C and Ci ≥ C, such that:
• If 0 < C < C, there is at least onesome-make-AR equilibrium.
• If C < C < Ci, there is a none-make-AR equilibrium and at least twosome-
make-AR equilibria.
• If C > Ci, none-make-AR is the unique equilibrium.
For simplicity, we do not consider the boundary cases C = C and C = Ci in our
discussion.
No-information model 1
We consider the first no-information model. For each type of equilibria, we determine
the range of costs in which they may occur.
Some-make-AR equilibria. If all customers follow a strategy with threshold
τe, that strategy is an equilibrium strategy if and only if a customer with arrival time
τe (referred to as a threshold customer) is indifferent between the actions AR and
AR′. We denote piAR (τe) the probability that a threshold customer gets service upon
chosen action AR, and piAR′ (τe) the probability that a threshold customer gets service
upon chosen action AR′. Hence, a strategy with threshold τe is an equilibrium if and
only if
(1− C) piAR (τe) = piAR′ (τe) , (3.8)
where the left hand side of Eq. (3.8) is the expected payoff of AR and the right hand
side is the expected payoff of AR′. Using Eq. (3.8), we express the cost as a function
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of the threshold
C1 (τe) , 1− piAR′ (τe)
piAR (τe)
. (3.9)
Next, we develop the expressions piAR (τe) and piAR′ (τe). The former expression
corresponds to the probability that either the demand is at most N or the demand
exceeds N but fewer than N customers make AR. The number of customers making
AR, given D˜ = j with j ≥ N , is a random variable that follows a binomial distribu-
tion. The number of trials is j and the success probability is 1− τe. The probability
that the threshold customer gets service is equal to the probability that the number
of successes is at most N − 1. By summing this probability over all possible values
of j, we get:
piAR (τe) = P
(
D˜ < N
)
+
∞∑
j=N
N−1∑
i=0
P
(
D˜ = j
)
τ ie (1− τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
. (3.10)
Likewise, we have
piAR′ (τe) = P
(
D˜ < N
)
+
∞∑
j=N
N−1∑
i=0
P
(
D˜ = j
)
τ ie (1− τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
N − i
j + 1− i . (3.11)
In that case, if the demand exceeds N but fewer than N customers make AR, service
is not guaranteed. Given a demand j and a number of reservations i, the probability
to get service without AR is the ratio of the number of unreserved servers N − i to
the number of customers that did not make AR j + 1− i.
Next, we prove that these two functions are continuous.
Lemma 3. The functions piAR′ and piAR are continuous functions of τe in the range
[0, 1].
Proof. Starting with Eq. (3.10) and ignoring the first term of the function which does
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not depend on τe, we need to show that the second term is continuous. The inner
sum of the second term is continuous, since it is a finite sum of polynomial functions.
To prove that the outer sum is continuous, we use Cauchy’s uniform convergence
criterion (Trench, 2003). We shall show that for any  > 0 there exists an integer M
such that
sup
0≤τe≤1
m∑
j=n
N−1∑
i=0
P
(
D˜ = j
)
τ ie (1− τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
<  ∀n,m ≥M. (3.12)
The above expression is upper bounded by P
(
n ≤ D˜ ≤ m
)
which, in turn, is upper
bounded by P
(
D˜ ≥ n
)
. For any discrete distribution and  > 0 there exists M such
that P
(
D˜ ≥ n
)
<  for any n > M . Thus, we have shown that Eq. (3.12) holds true.
Since, for any τe ∈ [0, 1], piAR(τe) ≥ piAR′(τe), the proof is also valid for piAR′ .
Since both piAR′ and piAR are continuous and positive in the range τe ∈ [0, 1], we
deduce that C1 (τe) is a continuous function in this range. Next, we observe that if
all customers make AR, then the probability of service of a customer with arrival
time one (i.e., the last arriving customer) does not depend on his decision. Hence,
C1 (1) = 0. In any other case, the probability to get service is greater when making
AR. Hence, C1 (τe) > 0 for any 0 ≤ τe < 1. We denote the supremum value of C1 (τe)
as
C1 , sup
0<τe<1
C1 (τe). (3.13)
Since the equation C1(τe) = C has a solution if and only if C is smaller that the
supermum value of C1(τe), we conclude that a some-make-AR equilibrium exists if
C < C1 and does not exist if C > C1.
None-make-AR equilibrium. If none of the customers makes AR, all have the
same expected payoff piAR′ (0). A customer that deviates gets service with probability
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Figure 3·3: An example with 10 servers, Poisson distributed demand
with mean 15 and AR cost C = 0.45. The line C and the function
C(τe) intersect twice. Hence, there are twosome-make-AR equilibria.
Since C(1) < C, there is also a none-make-AR equilibrium.
piAR (0) = 1 and his payoff is 1 − C. Thus, if 1 − C < piAR′ (0), then none of the
customers will have an incentive to deviate. On the other hand, if 1− C > piAR′ (0),
then all the customers will have an incentive to deviate. By defining C , C1(0), we
conclude that if C > C, then a none-make-AR equilibrium exists. If C < C, then a
none-make-AR equilibrium does not exist.
By definition C1 ≥ C. Therefore, we have shown that for any value of 0 < C < 1,
at least one equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if the interval I =
(
C,C1
)
is not empty
(i.e., the supremum point is not reached at τe = 1), then for any C ∈ I, the equation
C = C1 (τe) must have at least two solutions due to the continuity of the function.
Therefore, any cost C ∈ I has at least two different some-make-AR equilibria (the
exact number of some-make-AR equilibria depends on the number of maximal points
of the function C (τe)). See Figure 3·3 for an illustration.
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No-information model 2
In this section, we show that the second game has the same equilibria structure as
the first one, but with different ranges.
Some-make-AR equilibria. If all the customers follow a strategy with thresh-
old τe, the probability to get service with or without making AR is calculated in the
same way as in the previous model. Thus, the functions piAR and piAR′ can be also
used in the analysis of this model. As in the first game, at a some-make-AR equi-
librium, the threshold customer is indifferent between the two actions AR and AR′.
Thus,
piAR (τe)− C = piAR′ (τe) , (3.14)
where the left hand side of the equation is the expected payoff of AR, while the right
hand side is the expected payoff AR′. In this model, the cost as a function of the
threshold is:
C2 (τe) , piAR (τe)− piAR′ (τe) . (3.15)
We define
C2 , sup
0<τe<1
C2 (τe). (3.16)
As is the first model, C2 (1) = 0 and C2 (τe) > 0 for any τe < 1. Thus, a some-make-
AR equilibrium exists if C < C2 and does not exist if C > C2.
None-make-AR equilibrium. If none of the customers makes AR, then the
expected payoffs of not making AR and the expected payoff of deviating are the
same as in the first model. Therefore, the range of costs that have a none-make-AR
equilibrium is the same as in the first model.
In conclusion, the difference between the analyses of the two games is that C1
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Figure 3·4: The cost function in the two no-information models with
N = 10. The demand is a Poisson random variable with mean equals
10.
may be different from C2. From Eq. (3.9) and (3.15), we obtain
C1 (τe)
C2 (τe)
=
1
piAR (τe)
∀τe ∈ (0, 1). (3.17)
In any some-make-AR equilibrium, the probability to get service is smaller than one.
Hence, for any τe ∈ (0, 1), C1 > C2 (as illustrated in Figure 3·4).
3.3 Revenue Maximization
In this section, we assume that the AR cost is a fee charged by the provider. She
can either charge the reservation fee only from customer granted service (this policy
is aligned with the first model discussed in the previous section) or to charge the AR
fee from any customer attempting to make AR (this policy is aligned with the second
model).
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Intuitively, there is a trade-off between those two policies. Given an equilibrium
with a certain expected fraction of customers making AR, the total expected number
of customer paying the fee is greater when applying the second policy. However,
Eq. (3.17) indicates that if the provider is aiming to achieve a certain fraction of
customers making AR, she will have to advertise a lower fee if using the second
policy. Our objective, in this section, is to determine which policy maximizes the
provider revenue from AR fees.
We define the maximum possible revenue for model i = 1, 2 as
R∗i = sup
0<τe<1
Ri (τe). (3.18)
Under some-make-AR equilibrium with threshold τe, the number of reservations is
DAR (τe) or simply DAR from now and on. In the first model, the expected revenue per
server is the expected number of reserved servers, multiplied by the fee and normalized
by the number of servers N :
R1 (τe) =
E[min (DAR, N)]C1 (τe)
N
. (3.19)
In the second model, it is the expected number of reservations, multiplied by the fee
and normalized by N :
R2 (τe) =
E[D]τeC2 (τe)
N
. (3.20)
By comparing these two functions, we state the following result:
Theorem 2. In AR games, the maximum possible revenue, at equilibrium, is greater
when charging the AR fee only from customers that get service and not from all
customers that make AR requests.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that for any given threshold, the first model
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yields greater revenue than the second. Namely, we show that for any value of
τe ∈ (0, 1) the following holds:
R1 (τe) > R2 (τe) . (3.21)
From Eqs. (3.19), (3.20) and (3.17), we obtain that showing that R1(τe) > R2(τe)
is equivalent to showing that
E[min (DAR, N)]− E[D] · τe · piAR (τe) > 0. (3.22)
First, we expand the first term of (3.22):
E[min (DAR, N)] =
N∑
i=0
P (DAR = i) i+
∞∑
i=N+1
P (DAR = i)N. (3.23)
The PDF of DAR is
P (DAR = i) =
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) τ ie (1− τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
. (3.24)
By combining Eq. (3.23) and (3.24), we get
E[min (DAR, N)] =
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i
P (D=j) τ ie (1−τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
i
+
∞∑
i=N+1
∞∑
j=i
P (D=j) τ ie (1−τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
N. (3.25)
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Next, we expand piAR (τe):
piAR (τe) = P
(
D˜ < N
)
+
N−1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=N
P
(
D˜ = j
)
τ ie (1−τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
=
N−1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j + 1)
(j + 1)
E[D]
τ ie (1−τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
=
N−1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=i+1
P (D = j)
j
E[D]
τ ie (1−τe)j−i−1
(
j − 1
i
)
=
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j)
j
E[D]
τ i−1e (1−τe)j−i
(
j − 1
i− 1
)
=
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j)
j
E[D]
τ i−1e (1−τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
i
j
. (3.26)
The explanation for Eq. (3.26) is as follows. We start from Eq. (3.10). We merge
the two terms in Eq. (3.10) and substitute P
(
D˜ = j
)
by the right hand side of
Eq. (3.1). Next, we replace j by j− 1 and start the sum at j = i instead of j = i+ 1.
Next, we do a similar change with the variable i. Finally, we multiple and divide the
expression by
(
j
i
)
.
In the next step, we multiply both sides of Eq. (3.26) by E[D] · τe:
E[D] · τe · piAR (τe) =
N∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) τ ie (1−τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
i. (3.27)
Finally, we substitute the first term of the left hand side of Eq. (3.22) with the right
hand side of Eq. (3.25) and the second term of the left hand side of Eq. (3.22) with
the right hand side of Eq. (3.27). We then get
E[min (DAR, N)]− E[D] · τe · piAR (τe) =
∞∑
i=N+1
∞∑
j=i
P (D = j) τ ie (1−τe)j−i
(
j
i
)
N > 0,
(3.28)
which completes the proof.
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The result of Theorem 2 is reassuring, since a mechanism that charges reserva-
tion fees only from customers getting service (first model) appears as more fair than
a mechanism that charges reservation fees from all customers making AR requests
(second model). Further, one may argue that the demand for service would decrease
under the latter charging scheme. The theorem proves that the latter scheme is
detrimental for the provider even if the demand for service were not reduced.
3.4 Price of Conservatism
In the previous section, we showed that in order to maximize the revenue, the provider
should choose the first policy, which yields higher revenue for any given fee. In this
section, we assume that the first policy is chosen and investigate different fees and
their impact on the revenue.
By means of example, we next show that the fee that maximizes the revenue may
yield more than one equilibrium, where one of them yields no revenue.
Example 1. Consider a system with 15 servers and a Poisson distributed demand
with parameter (mean) λ = 20. In this case, the maximum revenue per resource is
R∗1 = 0.41 and it is achieved with fee C
∗
1 = 0.47. Since C = 0.26, if charging C
∗
1 , then
none-make-AR is also an equilibrium. Hence, charging C∗1 may yield the maximum
possible revenue but may also yield no revenue. The revenue and fee functions are
illustrated in Figure 3·5.
If the fee that yields the maximum possible revenue is not unique, the provider
may prefer a fee with smaller but guaranteed revenue. In order to weigh the different
options, we propose the metric of price of conservatism (PoC). In the rest of this
section, we formally define the term PoC and derive it for different settings. Since we
only deal with the first model, the model index is removed in this section.
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Figure 3·5: An example with N = 15 servers and Poisson distributed
demand with parameter λ = 20. To fee that maximizes the revenue
belongs to a range with multiple equilibria, including none-make-AR.
In order to have a positive guaranteed revenue, the provider must choose a fee
smaller than C. Furthermore, if that fee has more than one equilibrium, then the
guaranteed revenue is defined as the minimum between the revenues of the different
some-make-AR equilibria. We define ZC as the set of some-make-AR equilibria of
the fee C, namely, ZC = {τe : C(τe) = C, 0 < τe < 1}. The maximum expected
guaranteed revenue is defined as follows:
R∗g = sup
0<C<C
(
inf
τe∈ZC
R (τe)
)
. (3.29)
The following definition captures the potential revenue loss resulting from a conser-
vative pricing decision.
Definition 5. The price of conservatism (PoC) is the ratio of the expected maximum
possible revenue R∗ to the expected maximum guaranteed revenue R∗g.
Next, we evaluate the provider’s revenue and PoC under the assumption that the
demand D is a Poisson random variable with parameter λ. We denote the number of
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customers not making AR by DAR′ . Due to the properties of Poisson games (Myerson,
1998), DAR and DAR′ are independent Poisson random variables with parameter λτe
and λ (1− τe), respectively. Furthermore, the total number of customers and the
number of customers making each action, as seen by a customer if not counting
himself, has the same distributions as D, DAR and DAR′ respectively.
3.4.1 Single-server Case
We start with the special case N = 1. If all customers follow a strategy with threshold
τe, the probability that the threshold customer will get service is:
1. If making AR:
piAR (τe) = e
−λτe , (3.30)
which is the probability that beside the customer that arrives at the threshold,
no one makes AR (i.e., all the customers arrive after the threshold point).
2. If not making AR:
piAR′ (τe) = e
−λτe
∞∑
i=0
e−λ(1−τe) (λ(1− τe))i
i!
1
i+ 1
=
e−λ
(−1 + eλ(1−τe))
λ(1− τe) , (3.31)
which is the probability that none of the customers makes AR, multiplied by
the probability to get service given that none of the customers makes AR.
By substituting Eqs. (3.30) and (3.31) in Eq. (3.9), we get
C (τe) =
e−λ(1−τe) + λ(1− τe)− 1
λ(1− τe) . (3.32)
Lemma 4. For the case N = 1, C (τe) is a monotonically decreasing function.
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Proof. The derivative of C (τe) is:
dC
dτe
=
e−λ(1−τe)
(−eλ(1−τe) + 1 + λ(1− τe))
λ(1− τe)2 . (3.33)
Since λ(1 − τe)2 ≥ 0, e−λ(1−τe) ≥ 0 and −eλ(1−τe) + 1 + λ(1 − τe) < 0 for any λ > 0
and 0 < τe < 1, we conclude that
dC
dτe
< 0.
From the lemma, we infer that C = C (0). Thus, by definition,
C = C =
e−λ + λ− 1
λ
. (3.34)
Therefore, for any fee smaller than C there is no none-make-AR equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, for any value of C between zero and C, the equation C = C (τe) has a
single solution and therefore the some-make-AR equilibrium is unique. The result is
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. In a single server system, the equilibrium is unique and its type is:
• Some-make-AR equilibrium if 0 < C < e−λ+λ−1
λ
.
• None-make-AR equilibrium if C > e−λ+λ−1
λ
.
The expected revenue R (τe) in the case N = 1 is equal to the probability that at
least one customer makes AR multiplied by the fee:
R (τe) =
(
1− e−λτe)(e−λ(1−τe) + λ(1− τe)− 1
λ(1− τe) .
)
. (3.35)
Since the equilibrium is unique, the provider will maximize her expected revenue by
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Figure 3·6: λ = 1.2, N = 1. The reservation fee C (τe) is a mono-
tonically increasing function of the threshold τe. The revenue function
R (τe) is concave with maximum value at τ
∗
e = 0.523.
choosing C∗ = C (τ ∗e ) where:
τ ∗e = arg max
0<τe<1
R (τe). (3.36)
Due to the uniqueness of the equilibrium, R∗ = R∗g = R (τ
∗
e ). Hence:
Corollary 1. In a single server system, the price of conservatism is 1.
Example 2. We consider a system with N = 1 server and average demand λ = 1.2.
For this system, the maximum fee that leads to a some-make-AR equilibrium is C =
0.417. The optimal fee is obtained when τ ∗e = 0.477 (i.e., when on average 47.7%
of the customers make AR). This threshold is achieved when the provider sets a fee
C∗ = 0.257. The provider’s expected revenue in this case is R (τ ∗e ) = 0.112. Figure 3·6
shows the fee and revenue as functions of the threshold τe.
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3.4.2 Many-server Case
In this section, we study the behavior of the system when the number of servers goes
to infinity. We distinguish between overloaded and underloaded systems.
Overloaded system
We start with an overloaded system and we show that the PoC is a function of the
ratio between the average demand and the number of servers.
Theorem 4. In an overloaded many-server system, where λ = αN and α > 1, the
following holds:
lim
N→∞
R∗ = 1. (3.37)
lim
N→∞
R∗g = 1−
1
α
. (3.38)
Hence,
PoC =
α
α− 1 . (3.39)
Proof. In order to prove Eq. (3.37), we show that if the fee approaches one from
below, there is a some-make-AR equilibrium where almost all servers are reserved.
Let τe = 1 − 1/α, hence DAR is Poisson distributed with parameter N . The
probability that the threshold customer gets service is equivalent to the probability
that DAR will be smaller than N , which, in turn, is equal to
lim
N→∞
P (DAR < N) =
1
2
. (3.40)
Next, we show that when τe = 1−1/α, the probability to get service if not making
AR tends to zero as N → ∞. First, recall Chebyshev’s inequality which states that
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for any random variable X and real positive number Q
P (|X − EX|) ≥ Q) ≤ VarX
Q2
. (3.41)
Setting Q = δ
√
N where δ is a positive real number, we get from Eq. (3.41)
P
(
|DAR −N |) ≥ δ
√
N
)
≤ 1
δ2
. (3.42)
In the same way, setting Q = 
√
(α− 1)N where  is a positive real number, we
get
P
(
|DAR′ − (α− 1)N |) ≥ 
√
(α− 1)N
)
≤ 1
2
. (3.43)
Hence,
P
(
DAR′ ≤ (α− 1)N − 
√
(α− 1)N
)
≤ 1
2
. (3.44)
From Eqs. (3.42) and (3.44), we deduce that with probability one the number of
free servers DAR − N is O
(√
N
)
while DAR′ is (α− 1)N + O
(√
N
)
. Hence, for
any α > 1, as N → ∞, a customer that does not make AR will get service with
probability zero.
We showed that when N →∞ and τe is such that on average N customers make
AR, the expected payoff of the threshold customer tends to 0.5(1−C) if making AR
and to zero if not making AR. Thus, a strategy with threshold τe is an equilibrium
only if C tends to one. Therefore, we conclude that there exists a value of τe such
that on average N customers make AR while the fee is almost one. Therefore, in an
overloaded system:
lim
N→∞
R∗ = 1. (3.45)
Next, we show that Eq. (3.38) holds. If none of the customers makes AR, they all
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have the same probability to get service. Again, due to Chebyshev’s inequality, for
any δ > 1, the following holds:
P
(
αN − δ
√
αN ≤ D ≤ αN + δ
√
αN
)
≤ 1
δ2
. (3.46)
In other words, with probability one the demand is αN + O(
√
N). In this case, as
N →∞ the fraction of customers getting service converges to 1/α. Hence,
lim
N→∞
piAR′(0) =
1
α
. (3.47)
On the other hand, when deviating from the none-make-AR strategy, the probability
to get service is piAR(0) = 1. Thus,
lim
N→∞
C = 1− 1
α
. (3.48)
Next, we show that in the overloaded system, if C < C, then in any some-make-AR
equilibrium almost all servers are reserved. By contradiction, we assume that there
exists a some-make-AR equilibrium with threshold τe such that, C(τe) < 1 − 1/α
and E[DAR] = δN where 0 < δ < 1. In this case, the probability of the threshold
customer to get service if making AR converges to one as N →∞. Thus, his expected
payoff is greater than 1/α. If not making AR, his probability to get service is smaller
than 1/α (which is the probability to get service if none makes AR). Therefore, the
expected payoff of the threshold customer is greater if making AR than if not making
AR, which contradicts the definition of a some-make-AR equilibrium. Hence, we have
shown that the assumption cannot hold true. Thus, with probability one, the number
of reservation will be at least N + o (N). Therefore, with probability one, the ratio
between the number of free servers and the number of servers is zero. The provider
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will maximize her guaranteed revenue by advertising a fee just below C and we finally
obtain
lim
N→∞
R∗g = 1−
1
α
. (3.49)
The results indicate that if α is almost one and none of the customers makes AR
then, in order to persuade customers to deviate, the provider will have to advertise
a fee close to zero. Such fee will yield almost revenue per resource. In other words,
although there is an equilibrium that yields a revenue per resource of almost one, if
initially none of the customers makes AR, any fee the provider will advertise will not
significantly increase her revenue.
Underloaded system
In an underloaded many-server system we show that any fee leads to an asymptotically
zero revenue.
Theorem 5. In an underloaded many-server system, where λ = αN and α < 1, the
following holds:
lim
N→∞
R∗ = R∗g = 0. (3.50)
Proof. Given any α < 1 and any  > 0, we can find a large enough N such that
P (D > N) ≤ . (3.51)
In other words, for large enoughN , the probability that the demand will exceed the
number of servers tends to zero. In this case, the dominant strategy of all customers,
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regardless of their arrival time, is not to make AR. Hence,
lim
N→∞
C = 0. (3.52)
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce AR games. We assume that customers have no infor-
mation about the availability of servers and we analyzed two versions of the game.
In one version, the AR cost is only applied to customers who get service, while in the
second version, the AR cost is applied to all customers that attempt AR.
First, we show that, at equilibrium, either all customers that arrive earlier than
some threshold point make AR or none of them makes AR. Next, we prove the
existence of at least one Nash equilibrium and find the range of costs that determine
each equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that in some situations there are multiple
equilibria. By means of an example, we show that a given AR cost can lead to an
equilibrium with zero reservations and also to an equilibrium where almost all servers
are reserved in advance. We then assume that the AR cost is a fee charged by the
provider. We show that charging a fee from all customers attempting to reserve a
server can only reduce the provider’s revenue.
In order for a provider to decide on a proper AR fee, we propose the concept
of Price of Conservatism (PoC) which corresponds to the ratio of the maximum
possible expected revenue to the maximum guaranteed expected revenue. A greater
PoC indicates greater potential revenue loss if the provider opts to be conservative.
We focus on the model where charges are collected only from the customers getting
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service and assume that the demand is Poisson distributed. First, we show that in
a single server system the equilibrium is unique. Thus, PoC = 1 and the provider
experiences no loss. Next, we show that in an overloaded many-server system where
the average demand is λ = αN with α > 1, the maximum possible expected revenue
tends to one, while, the maximum guaranteed expected revenue tends to 1 − 1/α
as N → ∞. Hence PoC = α/(α − 1), which increases in an unbounded fashion as
α approaches 1 from above. Finally, we show that in an underloaded many-server
system, the provider cannot make revenue from AR fees.
Chapter 4
Advance Reservation Games with
Information Sharing
In the previous chapter, we assumed that the customers has no information about
servers availability. In contrast, in this chapter, we assume that the provider shares
some information with the customers. We analyze three versions of the game. In
the first version (binary-information game), customers only know whether a server is
available or not; in the second version (full-information game), customers know the
exact number of available servers; finally, in the third version (partial-information
game), the provider informs the customers about the exact number of available servers
when this number is small, and hides this information otherwise.
After analyzing those three games separately, we use simulations and a numeric
example to evaluate which policy maximizes the number of reservations.
The games in this chapter share the same assumptions as the first game described
in Section 3.1 (i.e., the first no-information model), except for using different informa-
tion sharing policies. Note that a version in which AR costs is applied on customers
that do not get service (the No-information model 2) is not relevant for these three
games since service is now granted to all customers that make AR.
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4.1 Binary-information Game
In this model, customers make decisions based on statistical information and also
based on the knowledge that a server is currently available at the desired slot. Next,
we show that this additional information has no effect on the decisions of customers
and each cost leads to the same set of equilibria as in the first no-information model.
Lemma 5. In the binary-information-game, at equilibrium, all customers follow a
threshold strategy.
Proof. Suppose a customer is informed that a server is available. For this case, we
show that the expected payoff of not making AR is a non-increasing function of the
arrival time while the payoff of making AR is fixed to 1−C. Using similar arguments
as in the no-information case (see Lemma 2), one can then show that the only possible
equilibrium is a threshold strategy.
We define D˜AR(t) to be the number of reservations made before time t. We need
to show that for any t1 > t2, regardless of the strategy σ followed by the rest of the
customers, the following holds:
P
(
S|t1, D˜AR(t1) < N,AR′
)
≤ P
(
S|t2, D˜AR(t2) < N,AR′
)
, (4.1)
where the left (right) hand side is the probability of a customer with arrival time t1
(t2) to get service, given that the number of reservations made before his request is
smaller than N and the chosen action is AR′. Using conditional probability, Eq. (4.1)
can be rewritten as
P
(
S, D˜AR(t1) < N |t1, AR′
)
P
(
D˜AR(t1) < N |t1, AR′
) ≤ P
(
S, D˜AR(t2) < N |t2, AR′
)
P
(
D˜AR(t2) < N |t2, AR′
) . (4.2)
The event {S} is contained the event {D˜AR(·) < N}. Moreover, under action AR′
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the probability to get service does not depend on the arrival time. We deduce that
the numerators on both sides of the equation above are equal.
Since D˜AR(t2) is stochastically larger or equal to D˜AR(t1) when t2 < t1, we deduce
that the denominator of the right hand side of Eq. (4.2) is smaller or equal to the
denominator of the left hand side of Eq. (4.2). Thus, we have shown that Eq. (4.1)
holds.
Some-make-AR equilibrium. Consider first the no-information model and a
some-make-AR equilibrium with threshold τe, but assume that the threshold customer
is being informed that a server is available, namely D˜AR(τe) < N . If he makes AR, his
payoff is 1−C. The expected payoff of not making AR is P
(
S|τe, D˜AR(τe) < N,AR′
)
,
which is the probability that the threshold customer gets service, given that all cus-
tomers follow a strategy with threshold τe, that there is at least one free server and
that the decision is AR′. Next, we show
P
(
S|τe, D˜AR(τe) < N,AR′
)
=
piAR′ (τe)
piAR (τe)
. (4.3)
By conditioning on the event {D˜AR(τe) < N}, we get
P
(
S|τe, D˜AR(τe) < N,AR′
)
=
P
(
S, D˜AR(τe) < N |τe, AR′
)
P
(
D˜AR(τe) < N |τe, AR′
) . (4.4)
Since a customer cannot get service when observing no free servers, the numerator
P (S,DAR(τe) < N |τe, AR′) is equal to P (S|τe, AR′) which is equal by definition to
piAR′ (τe).
The denominator P
(
D˜AR(τe) < N |τe, AR′
)
is the probability that the threshold
customer will see the event {D˜AR(τe) < N} (the fact that he does not make AR is
irrelevant). This, in turn, can be rephrased as the probability to get service when
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making AR exactly at the threshold point without knowing if there are free servers,
which is the definition of piAR (τe). Thus, P
(
D˜AR(τe) < N |τe, AR′
)
= piAR (τe).
We have shown that Eq. (4.3) holds true for any τe. Using Eq. (3.8), we deduce
that the threshold customer stays indifferent between the two actions after being
informed that a server is available. Hence, we conclude that if a threshold strategy
is an equilibrium strategy in the first model, it is also an equilibrium strategy in the
third model.
None-make-AR equilibrium. If none of the customers makes AR, the expected
payoffs of not making AR and the expected payoff of deviating are the same as in
the first and second models. Therefore, the range of fees that have a none-make-AR
equilibrium is the same as in the other two models.
Theorem 6. In AR games, if the AR cost is applied only on served customers, then
informing customers that servers are available or hiding this information lead to the
same equilibria.
4.2 Full-information Game
In this section, we assume that upon making an inquiry, customers observe the exact
number of available servers n ∈ {0, N}. This change in the model greatly affects the
analysis and nature of equilibria, since the decision of a customer affects information
provided to other customers.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
First, we provide definitions and technical results that which we will later use to prove
the main results of this section.
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Probability of Service. We define P(S|σ, D˜AR(t) = N−n) to be the probability
of service of a customer that arrives at time t, observes n ≥ 1 available servers and
chooses AR′, while the rest of the customers follows the strategy σ. The probability
of service applies only to customers that choose AR′, since service is granted to
customers that choose AR upon observing n ≥ 1 available servers.
Non-degenerate Equilibria. As in the previous chapter, we wish to ignore de-
generate equilibria. Thus, we assume:
Assumption 2. Let n ≥ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. At equilibrium, if σ(n, t) = x,
then there must exist a non-zero measure interval I such that t ∈ I and σ(n, t′) = x
for all t′ ∈ I.
Lemma 6. Let Xt be a non-negative random variable with parameter t. Let g(x)
be a non-negative function of x whose derivative is positive with respect to x for
x ∈ [k, l] and non-negative elsewhere. If the complementary cumulative distribution
function (CCDF) F¯Xt(x) strictly increases with t for any x ∈ [k, l] and increases with
t elsewhere, then E[g(Xt)] strictly increases with t.
Proof. Let x ∈ [k, l], γ = g(x) and t2 > t1. Then,
P(g(Xt2)>γ) = P(Xt2>x) > P(Xt1>x) = P(g(Xt1)>γ), ∀x ∈ [k, l]. (4.5)
Using the well-known formula for the expectation of a non-negative random variable
(Ross et al., 1996, Chapter 9)
E[X] =
∞∫
0
P(X>γ)dγ, (4.6)
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we obtain
E[g(Xt1)] =
g(k)∫
0
P(g(Xt1)>γ)dγ +
g(l)∫
g(k)
P(g(Xt1)>γ)dγ +
∞∫
g(l)
P(g(Xt1)>γ)dγ (4.7)
and
E[g(Xt2)] =
g(k)∫
0
P(g(Xt2)>γ)dγ +
g(l)∫
g(k)
P(g(Xt2)>γ)dγ +
∞∫
g(l)
P(g(Xt2)>γ)dγ. (4.8)
From Eq. (4.5), we know that the middle term in the RHS of Eq. (4.7) is strictly
smaller than that in Eq. (4.8), while the two other terms in Eq. (4.7) are no larger than
the corresponding terms in Eq. (4.8). Thus, we deduce that E[g(Xt2)] > E[g(Xt1)].
Definition 6. Let {ak, .., al} be a set of positive real numbers, t be a real number
and h(t) be a general positive function of t whose derivative is strictly negative with
respect to t. A discrete non-negative random variable Xt supported in [k, l] is said to
belong to the distributions family F if it has the following CDF:
FXt(x) , P(Xt ≤ x) =
x∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j
l∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j
, ∀x ∈ [k, l]. (4.9)
Lemma 7. Suppose Xt is a discrete random variable, supported in [k, l] with a CDF
FXt. If FXt ∈ F , then for any x ∈ [k, l), FXt(x) strictly increases with t.
Proof. We compute the derivative of FXt (as defined in Eq. (4.9)) with respect to t
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and show that it is positive:
dFXt
dt
=
−
x∑
i=k
aii|h′(t)| (h(t))i−1
l∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j +
x∑
i=k
ai (h(t))
i
l∑
j=k
ajj|h′(t)| (h(t))j−1(
l∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j
)2
=
x∑
i=k
(
ai (h(t))
i−1
(
−i|h′(t)|
l∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j +
l∑
j=k
ajj|h′(t)| (h(t))j
))
(
l∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j
)2
=
x∑
i=k
ai (h(t))
i−1 l∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j |h′(t)| (−i+ j)(
l∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j
)2
=
x∑
i=k
ai (h(t))
i−1 x∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j |h′(t)| (−i+j)(
l∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j
)2 +
x∑
i=k
ai (h(t))
i−1 l∑
j=x+1
aj (h(t))
j |h′(t)| (−i+j)(
l∑
j=k
aj (h(t))
j
)2 .
(4.10)
In the numerator of Eq. (4.10), the first term is canceled out due to symmetry and
the second term is positive for any x ∈ [k, l)
Next, we show that for any strategy σ, the number of reservations (stochastically)
increases with the demand.
Lemma 8. If all customers follow an arbitrary strategy σ, then, P(D˜AR>d˜AR|σ, D˜= d˜)
increases with d˜.
Proof. The proof is based on a coupling argument (Ross et al., 1996, Chapter 9).
Consider a realization R1 with demand d˜ and set of arrival times T = {t1, t2, ..., td}.
Consider a second realization R2 which is identical to R1 but with an additional
customer with arrival time t′ that observes n′ available servers. We respectively denote
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D˜1AR(t) and D˜
2
AR(t) as the number of reservations made by time t in realizations R1
and R2.
If σ(t′, n′) = 0 (i.e., the additional customer does not make AR), then R1 and R2
are identical in terms of the number of reservations. Otherwise, D˜2AR(t
′) > D˜1AR(t
′).
Let T ′ = {t | t ∈ T, t> t′}. If there is an arrival point t′′ ∈ T ′ such that D˜2AR(t′′) =
D˜1AR(t
′′), then R1 and R2 merge (i.e., the decisions of all customers that arrive after
t′′ are identical in both realizations). In this case, the number of reservations in both
realizations are equal. If there is no such t′′, then the total number of reservations in
R2 is larger than in R1. We conclude that, in any case, the number of reservations
D˜AR cannot decrease with the demand.
4.2.2 Equilibria Analysis
First, we show that even if customers are indifferent between the actions AR and
AR′, a mixed strategy cannot be an equilibrium.
Lemma 9. At equilibrium, none of the customers uses a mixed strategy.
Proof. The proof goes by contradiction. Consider an interval of arrival times I and
a number of available servers 1 ≤ n ≤ N , such that all customers with arrival times
in I that observe n available servers use a mixed strategy. In this case, there is a
strictly positive probability that one or more reservations will be made during this
time interval. Thus, the probability of service, when choosing AR′, depends on the
arrival time. In contrast, the payoff of choosing AR is a constant. Thus, a non-zero
measure interval in which customers are indifferent between the actions AR and AR′
does not exist, and hence a mixed strategy cannot be an equilibrium strategy in that
interval. Note that the case of a mixed strategy over a measure zero interval can be
ignored by Assumption 2.
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Next, we state that there exist N thresholds, such that, at equilibrium, a customer
that observes n available servers will make a reservation only if he arrives before the
n-th threshold.
Definition 7. Let τ e = {τ e1 , τ e2 , ..., τ eN}, where 0 ≤ τ eN ≤ τ eN−1 ≤ ... ≤ τ e1 ≤ 1. A
strategy function σ(t, n) is a threshold strategy if it has the form:
σ(t, n) =
{
1 if t < τ en,
0 if t ≥ τ en.
(4.11)
Theorem 7. At equilibrium, all customers follow a threshold strategy.
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction. First, we show that, at equilibrium, a
threshold strategy is followed by customers that observe N available servers. Then,
we show that if all customers that observe n ∈ [k, k + 1, . . . , N ] available servers
follow a threshold strategy, then a threshold strategy is also followed by customers
that observe k − 1 available servers.
Base case. From Lemma 9, we know that, at equilibrium, the strategy followed
by all customers that observe a certain number of available servers is a set of intervals
where in each interval either all customers choose AR or all choose AR′. Consider
the intervals I1 = (t1, t2) and I2 = (t2, t3), where t3 > t2 > t1. Let assume by
contradiction that there is an equilibrium strategy σ such that σ(t, N) = 0 for all
t ∈ I1 and σ(t, N) = 1 for all t ∈ I2. In this case, the following must hold:
P(S|σ, D˜AR(t)=0) ≥ 1− C, ∀t ∈ I1 (4.12)
and
P(S|σ, D˜AR(t)=0) ≤ 1− C, ∀t ∈ I2. (4.13)
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Next, we show that P(S|σ, D˜AR(t) = 0) strictly increases with t within I2, and hence
the payoff when choosing AR along the interval I2 must be strictly larger than 1−C,
which leads to a contradiction.
Using the law of total probability, conditioned on the demand, the probability of
service can be written
P(S|σ, D˜AR(t)=0) =
b∑
i=a
P(S|σ, D˜= i, D˜AR(t)=0)P(D˜= i|σ, D˜AR(t)=0). (4.14)
Using Lemma 6, we next show that P(S|σ, D˜AR(t) = 0) strictly increases with t. To
do so, we show that
(i) For any d˜ ∈ [a, b), P(D˜ > d˜|σ, D˜AR(t) = 0) strictly decreases with t (the condi-
tional random variable D˜|{σ, D˜AR(t)=0} corresponds to Xt in Lemma 6).
(ii) Within the range d˜ ∈ [N, b], P(S|σ, D˜ = d˜, D˜AR(t) = 0) (which corresponds to
g(x) in Lemma 6) strictly decreases with d˜ (which corresponds to x in Lemma 6).
Starting with (i), we define TAR′(t) to be the sum of length of intervals within
customers that observe N available servers choose AR′ prior to t under strategy σ.
From Bayes’ Theorem, the distribution of D˜|{σ, D˜AR(t) = 0} is
P(D˜= i|σ, D˜AR(t)=0) = P(D˜= i, D˜AR(t)=0|σ)P(D˜AR(t)=0|σ)
, ∀i ∈ [a, b]. (4.15)
The term P(D˜= i, D˜AR(t)=0|σ) is the probability that i customers arrive, and each
customer arrives either within intervals where customers do not make AR or after t.
Since the arrival time of each customer is independent of others, the probability that
a customer arrives either within intervals where customers do not make AR or after
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t is TAR′(t) + (1− t). Thus, for any i ∈ [a, b],
P(D˜≤ i, D˜AR(t)=0|σ)
P(D˜AR(t)=0|σ)
=
i∑
j=a
P(D˜=j)P(D˜AR(t)=0)|σ, D˜=j)
b∑
j=a
P(D˜=j)P(D˜AR(t)=0|σ, D˜=j)
=
i∑
j=a
P(D˜=j)(TAR′(t) + 1− t)j
b∑
j=a
P(D˜=j)(TAR′(t) + 1− t)j
. (4.16)
Since TAR′(t) is a constant within the interval I2, the term TAR′(t) + 1− t decreases
with t. By Definition 6, the conditional random variable D˜|{σ, D˜AR(t) = 0} belongs
to the family of distributions F , where P(D˜=j) corresponds to aj and TAR′(t)+1− t
corresponds to h(t). Hence, by Lemma 7, for any d˜ ∈ [a, b), P(D˜ > d˜|σ, D˜AR(t) = 0)
strictly decreases with t.
Next we prove (ii). Using the law of total probability, conditioned on the number
of reservations, the probability of service can be written
P(S|σ, D˜= d˜, D˜AR(t)=0) =
b∑
i=a
P(S|D˜= d˜, D˜AR= i)P(D˜AR= i|σ, D˜= d˜, D˜AR(t)=0).
(4.17)
From the definition of the model,
P(S|D˜= d˜, D˜AR= d˜AR) =

1 if d˜ < N,
N−d˜AR
d˜+1−d˜AR if d˜ ≥ N and d˜AR < N,
0 otherwise.
(4.18)
From Eq. (4.18), one can see that P(S|D˜= d˜, D˜AR= d˜AR) decreases with both d˜ and
d˜AR. Furthermore, Lemma 8 showed that the number of reservations cannot decrease
as the demand increases. Thus, for any demand realizations d˜1 > d˜2 the following
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holds:
P(S|σ, D˜= d˜1, D˜AR(t)=0) =
b∑
i=a
P(S|D˜= d˜1, D˜AR= i)P(D˜AR= i|σ, D˜= d˜1, D˜AR(t)=0)
(4.19)
≤
b∑
i=a
P(S|D˜= d˜2, D˜AR= i)P(D˜AR= i|σ, D˜= d˜1, D˜AR(t)=0)
(4.20)
≤
b∑
i=a
P(S|D˜= d˜2, D˜AR= i)P(D˜AR= i|σ, D˜= d˜2, D˜AR(t)=0)
(4.21)
= P(S|σ, D˜= d˜2, D˜AR(t)=0). (4.22)
Moreover, from Eq. (4.18), it follows that if d˜1 ≥ N , then Eq. (4.19) is strictly smaller
than Eq. (4.20).
We showed that both items 1 and 2 hold. Hence, P(S|σ, D˜AR(t) = 0) strictly
increases with t. Therefore, at equilibrium, an interval within which customers choose
AR′ cannot be followed by an interval within which customers choose AR. Hence,
at equilibrium, the strategy followed by customers that observe N available servers
must be a threshold strategy.
Inductive step. We assume that a threshold strategy with thresholds τk ≥
τk+1,≥ ... ≥ τN is followed by all customers that observe n ∈ [k, k+1, . . . , N ] available
servers for 1 < k < N . We show that, at equilibrium, a threshold strategy with
threshold τk−1 ≥ τk must be followed by customers that observe k − 1 available
servers. We split the proof into two parts. In the first part, we show that a customer
with arrival time t′ < τk that observes k − 1 available servers is better off choosing
AR. Thus, there is a threshold τk−1 ≥ τk such that all customers that arrive before
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τk−1 and observe k− 1 available servers choose AR. In the second part, we show that
all customers that arrive after τk−1 and observe k − 1 available servers choose AR′.
Consider a scenario where a customer arrives at time t < τk and observes k
available servers and a second scenario where a customer arrives at the same time
and observes k − 1 available servers. We need to show that
P(S|σ, D˜AR(t)=N−k) ≥ P(S|σ, D˜AR(t)=N−k+1). (4.23)
From Eq. (4.19) - Eq. (4.22), it follows that the probability of service increases with
the demand, regardless of the number of available servers observed upon arrival (i.e.,
item 2 in the base case holds also for D˜AR)(t) 6= 0). Thus, we only need to show that
P(D˜>d˜|σ, D˜AR(t)=N−k+1)) ≥ P(D˜>d˜|σ, D˜AR(t)=N−k). (4.24)
From the induction’s assumption, a customer that observes k available servers knows
that exactly N−k customers arrived earlier. Likewise, a customer that observes k−1
available servers knows that at least N − k + 1 customers arrived earlier. Since the
system is sampled at the same time and the same strategy is followed in both cases,
and since arrivals are i.id, observing more reservations makes it more likely that the
demand will be larger. Thus, Eq. (4.24) holds.
Next, we prove the second part. We do so by showing that both items 1 and 2
in the base case also hold when observing k − 1 available servers. Starting with item
1, we show that the conditional random variable D˜|{σ, D˜AR(t) =N−k+1} belongs
to F . We denote by ARN−k+1 the event that the first N − k + 1 customers choose
AR (i.e., the i-th customer arrives before τi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N − k + 1). Let TAR′(t)
be the sum of length of intervals within which customers that observe k− 1 available
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servers choose AR′ under strategy σ. The CDF of D˜|{σ, D˜AR(t)=N−k+1} is
P(D˜≤j|σ, D˜AR(t)=N−k+1) =
i∑
j=N−k+1
P(D˜=j, D˜AR(t)=N−k+1|σ)
P(D˜AR(t)=N−k+1)
=
i∑
j=N−k+1
P(D˜=j)
(
j
N−k+1
)
P(ARN−k+1)(TAR′(t) + 1− t)j−(N−k+1)
b∑
j=N−k+1
P(D˜=j)
(
j
N−k+1
)
P(ARN−k+1)(TAR′(t) + 1− t)j−(N−k+1)
=
i∑
j=N−k+1
P(D˜=j)
(
j
N−k+1
)
(TAR′(t) + 1− t)j
b∑
j=N−k+1
P(D˜=j)
(
j
N−k+1
)
(TAR′(t) + 1− t)j
, ∀i ≥ N − k + 1. (4.25)
By Definition 6, this distribution belongs to F , where P(D˜=j)
(
j
N−k+1
)
corresponds to
aj and TAR′(t)+1− t corresponds to h(t). Thus, item 1 holds. As explained earlier in
the proof, item 2 also holds for DAR(t) = N − k+ 1. We conclude that for n = k− 1
it is also true that an interval within which customers choose AR cannot follow an
interval within which customers choose AR′. Hence, a threshold strategy is followed
by all customers that observe k − 1 available servers.
4.2.3 Impact of the AR Cost
In this chapter, we show that any AR cost leads to a unique equilibrium. Furthermore,
we show that there is a critical value C such that costs higher than C lead to an
equilibrium with no reservations.
First, we denote by στe an equilibrium strategy constructed by a set of N thresh-
olds τ e = {τ e1 , τ e2 , ..., τ eN}. For such a strategy to be an equilibrium, the following
must hold for any n ∈ {1, ..., N}:
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(i) If τ en > 0, then
P(S|στe , D˜AR(τ en)=N−n) = 1− C. (4.26)
(ii) If τ en = 0, then
P(S|στe , D˜AR(τ en)=N−n) ≥ 1− C. (4.27)
To understand this property, consider a virtual customer that arrives at time τ en and
observes 1 ≤ n ≤ N available servers. We refer to such a customer as the n-th
threshold customer. If τ en > 0, then customers that arrive before τ
e
n choose AR, while
customers that arrive after τ en choose AR
′. Hence, a customer that arrives exactly
at the threshold must be indifferent between the two options. If τ en = 0, then all
customers choose AR′. Thus, the probability of service of all customers (including
the n-th threshold customer) should be no smaller than 1− C.
To prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we will show that for each 1 ≤ n ≤ N
there is exactly one threshold τ en for which Eq. (4.26) or Eq. (4.27) hold. For this
purpose, we develop an expression of the probability of service of the n-th threshold
customer as a function of the set of thresholds τ = {τ1, τ2, ..., τN}. We denote this
quantity by pin(τ ). If the n-th threshold customer chooses AR
′, then all customers
that arrive after his also choose AR′. In this case D˜AR = N − n. The probability of
service of the n-th threshold customer is
pin(τ ) =
N−1∑
i=N−n
P(D˜= i|D˜AR=N−n) · 1 +
b∑
i=N
P(D˜= i|D˜AR=N−n) · n
i+1− (N−n) .
(4.28)
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The first term is the probability that the total demand is smaller than N (recall that
D˜ is the number of customers as observed by a tagged customer excluding himself).
In this case, service is guaranteed to all customers. The second term is the probability
to get service when the demand exceeds N . In this case, the n unreserved servers
will be arbitrarily allocated among customers that chose AR′. Next, we develop an
expression for pin(τ ) that directly relates to the system parameters (i.e., an expression
that does not include D˜AR).
Lemma 10. Let 1 ≤ n ≤ N . The probability of service of the n-th threshold customer
is
pin(τ ) =
N−1∑
i=N−n
P(D˜= i)
(
i
N−n
)
(1− τn)i +
b∑
i=N
P(D˜= i)
(
i
N−n
)
(1− τn)i ni+1−(N−n)
b∑
i=N−n
P(D˜= i)
(
i
N−n
)
(1− τn)i
.
(4.29)
Proof. First, we find an expression for P(D˜ = i|D˜AR = N − n). For brevity, let
m , N − n. Using Bayes’ theorem, we obtain
P(D˜= i|D˜AR=m) = P(D˜= i)P(D˜AR=m|D˜= i)P(D˜AR=m)
=
P(D˜= i)P(D˜AR=m|D˜= i)
b∑
k=m
P (D˜=k)P(D˜AR=m|D˜=k)
, ∀i ∈ [m, b]. (4.30)
Next, we develop an expression for P(D˜AR = m|D˜ = i). Given that i customers
request service, the probability that exactly m customers choose AR is the probability
that the first m customers among them choose AR (i.e., the arrival time of the j-th
customer is smaller than τN−j for all j ∈ {1, ...,m}), while the last i −m customers
choose AR′ (i.e., the arrival times of the m+ 1 customer and on are larger than τn).
65
We denote by ARm the event that a given subset of m customers choose AR in a
system that it is initially empty. The probability that the remaining i−m customers
choose AR′ in a system with n available servers is (1− τn)i−m. Thus,
P(D˜AR=m|D˜= i) =
(
j
m
)
P(ARm)(1− τn)i−m. (4.31)
The term P(ARm) will be canceled out, and therefore we do not develop an expression
for it. Substituting Eq. (4.30) and Eq. (4.31) into Eq. (4.28), we get
pin(τ ) =
N−1∑
i=m
P(D˜= i)
(
i
m
)
P(ARm)(1− τn)(i−m) +
b∑
i=N
P(D˜= i)
(
i
m
)
P(ARm)(1− τn)i−m ni+1−m
b∑
i=m
P(D˜= i)
(
i
m
)
P(ARm)(1− τn)(i−m)
.
(4.32)
Note that P(ARm) and (1− τn)−m do not depend on i. Since those two terms appear
in each term of the numerator and the denominator, we can cancel them out and
conclude that Eq. (4.29) holds.
From Lemma 10, we deduce:
Corollary 2. pin(τ ) only depends on τn ∈ τ .
We thus redefine the function pin(·) such that the threshold τn is its only input.
Example 3. Assume that the demand is uniformly distributed between 1, 2 and 3.
We compute the distribution of D˜ using Eq. (3.1):
P(D˜= i) =

1/6 if i = 0,
1/3 if i = 1,
1/2 if i = 2.
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Applying this demand distribution on Eq. (4.29), we get
pi2(τ2) =
1 + 2(1− τ2) + 2(1− τ2)2
1 + 2(1− τ2) + 3(1− τ2)2 , (4.33)
and
pi1(τ1) =
2 + 3(1− τ1)
2 + 6(1− τ1) . (4.34)
We will later return to this example. Next, we show that pin(τn) increases with both
τn and n. Those two properties are required for proving the uniqueness and existence
of the equilibrium.
Lemma 11. For any n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, the following holds:
(i) pin(τn) is continuous and strictly increasing in the range [0, 1).
(ii) pin(τ) > pin−1(τ), for any τ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. Set m = N − n and, for j ∈ [m, b], define
αj , P(D˜=j)
(
j
m
)
, (4.35)
and
βj ,
{
1 if j < N,
n
j+1−m if j ≥ N.
(4.36)
We rewrite Eq. (4.29)
pin(τn) =
b∑
j=m
αjβj(1− τn)j
b∑
i=m
αi(1− τn)i
. (4.37)
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For proving (i), we compute the derivative of pin(τn) with respect to τn and show that
it is positive for any τn ∈ [0, 1). We have
dpin
dτn
=
−
b∑
j=m
αjβjj(1− τn)j−1
b∑
i=m
αi(1− τn)i +
b∑
j=m
αjβj(1− τn)j
b∑
i=m
αii(1− τn)i−1(
b∑
i=m
αi(1− τn)i
)2
=
b∑
j=m
b∑
i=m
αjαiβj(1− τn)i+j−1(i− j)(
b∑
i=m
αi(1− τn)i
)2 . (4.38)
We need to show that the numerator of Eq. (4.38) is positive. Let consider any
element of the numerator {i = k, j = l} and it conjugate element {i = l, j = k}. By
summing these two elements we get
αlαk(1− τn)l+k−1(k − l)(βl − βk). (4.39)
Since βi = βi−1 for all i < N and βi > βi−1 for all i ≥ N , we deduce that βl − βk = 0
if both k and l are smaller than N . Otherwise, βl − βk has the same sign as k − l.
Thus, for any value of k and l, Eq. (4.39) is either zero or positive. We conclude that
the sum of the numerator of Eq. (4.38) is positive, and hence the derivative of pin(τn)
is positive.
Next, we show that pin(τn) is a continuous function in [0, 1). In Eq. (4.32), both the
numerator and denominator are probabilities. Hence, although they sum to infinity,
they have a finite limit for any value of τn ∈ [0, 1). Since they are both polynomial
expression of τn with a finite limit, they are continuous (see Cauchy’s uniform con-
vergence criterion (Trench, 2003, p.246)). The denominator is equal to zero only at
τn = 1. Thus, we conclude that pin(τn) is continuous in [0, 1).
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For proving (ii), we show that
b∑
i=m
αiβi(1− τ)i
b∑
i=m
αi(1− τ)i
−
b∑
j=m+1
αjβj(1− τ)j
b∑
j=m+1
αj(1− τ)j
> 0. (4.40)
This is equivalent to showing that
b∑
i=m
αiβi(1− τ)i
b∑
j=m+1
αj(1− τ)j −
b∑
i=m
αi(1− τ)i
b∑
j=m+1
αjβj(1− τ)j
=
b∑
i=m
αi(1− τ)i
(
βi
b∑
j=m+1
αj(1− τ)j −
b∑
j=m+1
αjβj(1− τ)j
)
=
b∑
i=m
αi(1− τ)i
(
b∑
j=m+1
αj(1− τ)j (βi − βj)
)
=
b∑
i=m
αi(1− τ)i
(
b∑
j=m
αj(1− τ)j (βi − βj)
)
+
b∑
i=m
αiαm(1− τ)i+m (βm − βi) > 0.
(4.41)
In Eq. (4.41), the first term is 0, while the second term is positive (note that, by
Eq. (4.36), βm=1).
We define two types of threshold equilibria:
Definition 8. In a none-make-AR equilibrium, none of the customers, regardless
of their arrival times, choose AR.
Definition 9. In a some-make-AR equilibrium, all customers follow a threshold
strategy with a set of thresholds 0 < τ eN < τ
e
N−1 < ... < τ
e
1 < 1.
We define the critical cost
C , 1− piN(0). (4.42)
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We are now ready to state the main result of this section:
Theorem 8. Given any number of servers N and any demand distribution D:
• If C < C, there exists a unique some-make-AR equilibrium.
• If C ≥ C, there exists a unique none-make-AR equilibrium.
Proof. From Theorem 7, we know that, at equilibrium, all customers follow a thresh-
old strategy. First, we show that, at equilibrium, all thresholds are smaller than 1
(i.e., an equilibrium where all customers choose AR regardless of their arrival time
does not exist). Let assume by contradiction that, for some n ∈ {1, N}, σ(t, n) = 1
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, the n-th threshold customer (which arrives at time 1)
knows that all customers that arrives earlier chose AR and since no customer will
arrive after him, his service is granted. That is,
pin(1) = 1, ∀n ∈ {1, ..., N}. (4.43)
Hence, the n-th threshold customer is better off choosing AR′ which leads to a con-
tradiction.
Next, assume that C < C. From Lemma 11, we deduce that, in this case, there
is exactly one set of thresholds 0 < τ eN < τ
e
N−1 < ... < τ
e
1 < 1 such that, for any
n ∈ {1, N}, 1 − C = pin(τ en). We will now show this set represents a some-make-AR
equilibrium. Assume that all customers follow this set of thresholds. Consider a
customer with arrival time t < τ en that observes n available servers. His probability
of service is smaller than pin(t) since there is a positive probability that reservations
will be made between t and τ en, while pin(t) is the probability of service given that no
reservations will be made after time t. From the first part of Lemma 11, we know
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that pin(τ
e
n) > pin(t). Thus, his probability of service is smaller than the probability
of service of the n-th threshold customer and he is better off choosing AR.
Now, consider a customer with arrival time t > τ en that observes n available servers.
Since all customers that arrive later than τ en and observe n available servers choose
AR′, observing n available servers at time t is equivalent to observing n available
servers at time τ en. Thus, this customer (just like the n-th threshold customer) is
indifferent between the two actions and has no motivation to deviate. We conclude
that this set of thresholds represents a some-make-AR equilibrium. A none-make-AR
equilibrium does not exist, since if all customers choose AR′, there expected payoff is
1− C which is smaller than 1− C.
Finally, assume that C ≥ C. If all customers that observe N available servers
choose AR′, then they all have the same probability of service 1−C which is greater
than 1− C. Thus, none will deviate and none-make-AR is an equilibrium. A some-
make-AR equilibrium does not exist, since there is no value of τN for which 1− C =
piN(τN).
The two types of equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 4·1
Example 4. Continuing Example 3, we substitute Eq. (4.33) into Eq. (4.42) and get
C = 1−5/6. Thus, any C larger than 1/6 leads to a none-make-AR equilibrium. Next,
assume C = 0.1. By solving the equalities pi2(τ2) = 1−0.1 and pi1(τ1) = 1−0.1, using
Eq. (4.33) and Eq. (4.34), we obtain that the thresholds at equilibrium are τ e1 = 0.917
and τ e2 = 0.453. That is, if the first customer making an inquiry arrives before
t = 0.453, then he makes a reservation. If the demand is larger than 1 and the second
customer making an inquiry arrives before 0.917, then the second server will also be
reserved.
An example with Poisson distributed demand with mean 10 and 6 servers. The
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(a) C = 0.5. (b) C = 0.3.
Figure 4·1: An example of a system with 6 servers and Poisson dis-
tributed demand with mean λ = 10. The equilibrium is determined by
the expected payoff of a customer that arrives at the 6-th threshold and
observes 6 available servers. If that customer is better off not making
AR (a), then there is a none-make-AR equilibrium. If there is a thresh-
old such that the customer is indifferent between the two actions (b),
then there is a some-make-AR equilibrium.
figures show the expected payoff of a customer that observes an empty system and
arrives exactly at the 6-th threshold. If, for any threshold, the customer is better
off not making AR (a), then there is a none-make-AR equilibrium. If there is a
threshold such that the customer is indifferent between the two actions (b), than
there is a some-make-AR equilibrium.
4.2.4 Poisson Distributed Demand
In the previous section, we studied a game with demand that follows a general dis-
tribution. In this section, we apply the result on a system with Poisson distributed
demand with mean λ. As was showed in (Myerson, 1998), in Poisson games (i.e.,
games in which the number of players is Poisson distributed) the distributions of
D and D˜ are identical. Furthermore, if players are randomly ascribed to different
types with fixed probabilities, the number of players of each type is independent of
the number of players of other types and is also Poisson distributed. Hence, from
the perspective of the n-th threshold customer, the number of customers that arrive
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after him is a Poisson random variable with parameter λ(1− τn). If he chooses AR′,
then all those customers also choose AR′. Using this property, we can express the
probability of service in a simpler way than in Eq. (4.29), that is
pin(τn) =
N−1∑
i=0
P(D˜AR′= i) +
∞∑
i=N
P(D˜AR′= i)
n
i+ 1
. (4.44)
The first term is the probability that the number of customers choosing AR′ is smaller
than N . In this case, service is guaranteed to all customers. The second term is the
probability to get service when the demand exceeds N . In this case, the n unreserved
servers will be arbitrarily allocated to customers that chose AR′. We substitute
P(D˜AR′= i) = e−λ(1−τn)
(λ(1− τn))i
i!
(4.45)
into Eq. (4.44) and obtain a closed form expression for pin(τn), namely
pin(τn) = e
−λ(1−τn)
n−1∑
i=0
(λ(1− τn))i
i!
+ e−λ(1−τn)
∞∑
i=n
(λ(1− τn))i
i!
n
i+ 1
= e−λ(1−τn)
n−1∑
i=0
(λ(1− τn))i
i!
+
n
λ(1− τn)e
−λ(1−τn)
∞∑
i=n+1
(λ(1− τn))i
i!
= e−λ(1−τn)
n−1∑
i=0
(λ(1− τn))i
i!
+
n
λ(1− τn)
(
1− e−λ(1−τn)
n∑
i=0
(λ(1− τn))i
i!
)
.
(4.46)
Using the upper incomplete Gamma function
Γ[s, x] , (s− 1)!e−x
s−1∑
k=0
xk
k!
, (4.47)
73
we obtain
pin(τn) =
n
λ(1− τn) +
Γ[n, λ(1− τn)]
(n− 1)! −
Γ[1 + n, λ(1− τn)]
λ(1− τn)(n− 1)! . (4.48)
Example 5. Consider a game with N = 6 servers, average demand λ = 6 and
reservation cost C = 0.15. To find the equilibrium strategy, we first check which type
of equilibrium prevails. Since 1 − pi6(0) = 0.16 > 0.15, we deduce that the game has
a some-make-AR equilibrium (see Theorem 8). We then solve the following set of
equations:
1− 0.15 = n
6τn
+
Γ[n, 6(1− τn)]
(n− 1)! −
Γ[1 + n, 6(1− τn)]
6(1− τn)(n− 1)! , ∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
(4.49)
The solution is the set of thresholds τ e = {0.944, 0.787, 0.605, 0.416, 0.223, 0.027}.
That is, at equilibrium, a customer that observes an empty system (i.e., n = N) will
choose AR only if he arrives before t = 0.027, while a customer that observes one
available server will choose AR if he arrives before t = 0.944. Figure 4·2 shows the
intersection of 1− C with the functions pin(τn) for n = 1, 2, ...6.
In this example, the probability that all customers arrive after τ e6 , and hence all
customers choose AR′ is
∞∑
i=0
P(D= i)(1− τ e6 )i = e−6
∞∑
i=0
6i
i!
(0.973)i = 0.850. (4.50)
If the provider does not share information about the number of available servers, then
under the same parameters there is a unique equilibrium and the probability that all
customers choose AR′ is smaller than 0.01.
The example illustrates the drawback of the full-information policy: even if a
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Figure 4·2: Illustration of Example 5. For each number of available
servers i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 6, the probability of service pii as a function of
the threshold τ (which represents the expected payoff of a threshold
customer that is not making AR) intersects once with the line 1 − C
(which represents the payoff of any customer making AR), thus showing
the uniqueness of the equilibrium. As the number of available servers
i decreases, the time threshold at which customers stop making AR
increases (i.e., customers are more likely to make AR when observing
fewer available servers).
some-make-AR equilibrium exists, there is a high chance that no customer will make
a reservation.
4.3 Partial-information Model
We next consider a partial-information policy. Under this policy, customers are in-
formed about the number of available servers only if this number is below or equal to
some threshold denoted M , where M ∈ {1, 2, ..., N−1}. The drawback of this policy
is that an uninformed customer can deduce that the number of available servers is
larger than M . In this section, we analyze the equilibrium structure of the partial-
information policy, assuming that customers know that this policy is used. Note
that if M = N − 1, then an uninformed customer knows that all servers are avail-
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able, and therefore a partial-information policy with M = N − 1 is equivalent to the
full-information policy.
A result similar to Theorem 7 also holds for the partial-information game. Thus,
this game has the same two types of equilibria (i.e., none-make-AR and some-make-
AR), as the full-information game. In this game, all uninformed customers use the
same threshold, denoted by τu, which replaces the thresholds {τM+1, ..., τN}. Thus,
the set of thresholds now contains M + 1 thresholds. Eq. (4.29), which describes
the probability of service of the threshold customers in the full-information model,
is still valid for the informed customers. In order to find the threshold followed by
uninformed customers, we consider an uninformed threshold customer. As earlier,
this represents a virtual uninformed customer that arrives exactly at the threshold
followed by uninformed customers.
We denote the probability of service of the uninformed threshold customer by
piu(τu). We express it, using the law of total probability, by conditioning on the
number of available servers i ∈ {M+1,M+2, . . . , N}, given that at least N −M
servers are available. As we showed in the previous section, the probability of service
of the i-th threshold customer is independent of all other thresholds. Thus, we can
construct piu(τu) using pii(·) as defined in Eq. (4.29), namely
piu(τu) =
N∑
i=M+1
pii(τu)P(D˜AR=N − i|D˜AR<N −M). (4.51)
The distribution of D˜AR can be found using the law of total probability conditioned
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on D˜. Given D˜, D˜AR is a binomial random variable with success probability τu. Thus,
P(D˜AR= i) =
∞∑
j=i
P(D˜=j)P(D˜AR= i|D˜=j)
=
∞∑
j=i
P(D˜=j)
(
j
i
)
τ ju(1− τu)j−i. (4.52)
Next, we show that, unlike the probability of service of an informed threshold
customer, piu(τu) is not necessarily an increasing function of the threshold τu. In this
case, the equality piu(τu) = 1− C may hold for more than one value of τu and the
equilibrium will not be unique.
We prove our claim by the means of an example. Assume that the demand
is Poisson distributed with parameter λ. As in the previous section, we use the
properties of Poisson games to simplify the expression of piu(τu). If all uninformed
customers follow a threshold-strategy with threshold τu, then the number of customers
choosing AR (i.e., D˜AR) and the number of customers choosing AR
′ (i.e., D˜AR′) are
independent Poisson random variables with parameters λτ and λ(1−τu), respectively.
The probability of service of the uninformed threshold customer is
piu(τu) =
N−M−1∑
i=0
P(D˜AR= i|D˜AR<N −M)
N−i−1∑
j=0
P(D˜AR′=j) +
∞∑
j=N−i
P(D˜AR′=j)
N − i
j + 1
,
(4.53)
which is the sum of the probabilities that i customers choose AR, each multiplied by
the probability of service given i. The inner probabilities are
P(D˜AR= i|D˜AR<N −M) =
(λτu)i
i!
N−M−1∑
k=0
(λτu)k
k!
, (4.54)
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Figure 4·3: In example 6, the probability of service of the uninformed
threshold customer as a function of the threshold piu(τu) intersects twice
with the line 0.85, which is the payoff if making AR.
and
P(D˜AR′=j) =
e−λ(1−τu)(λ(1− τu))j
j!
. (4.55)
The following example shows that a game with Poisson distributed demand can have
several equilibria.
Example 6. We consider a system with the following parameters λ = 10, N = 10,
C = 0.15 and M = 3. From Eq. (4.53) - Eq. (4.55), we get (as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4·3) piu(0.429) = piu(0.172) = 1− 0.15. Using Eq. (4.48), we find the n-th thresh-
old for n = 1, 2, 3 and conclude that both {τ1=0.966, τ2=0.872, τ3=0.763, τu=0.172}
and {τ1=0.966, τ2=0.872, τ3=0.763, τu=0.429} represent equilibria strategies.
After showing that multiple equilibria may exist, we continue studying the equi-
librium structure of the game. First, we observe that if all customers choose AR′,
then the system is always empty and the information sharing policy has no effect on
the game’s outcome. Thus, when the reservation cost is larger than C (which is de-
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fined in Eq. (4.42)), the partial-information game has a none-make-AR equilibrium,
similar to the full-information game. However, in the partial-information game, the
equilibrium is not necessarily unique.
In order to have a unique none-make-AR equilibrium, we must have
1− C < piu(τu), ∀τu ∈ [0, 1]. (4.56)
We define
C = 1− inf
0≤τu≤1
piu(τu), (4.57)
and conclude that any cost above C leads to a unique none-make-AR equilibrium.
Next, we observe that if all customers choose AR, then the probability of service
of an uninformed threshold customer (i.e., a customer that arrives at time t = 1) is 1.
Thus, for any cost C < C, there is at least one value of τu such that
1− C = piu(τu). (4.58)
The number of some-make-AR equilibria is determined by the number of values of
τu for which Eq. (4.58) holds. If C is strictly smaller than C, then piu(τu) is not
a monotonic function. Hence, any C in the range (C,C) has at least two some-
make-AR equilibria. The following theorem summarizes the equilibria structure of
the partial-information game:
Theorem 9. In the partial-information game, there exist quantities C and C ≥ C,
such that
• If 0 < C < C, there is at least one some-make-AR equilibrium.
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Figure 4·4: The expected payoff of the uninformed threshold customer
as a function of the threshold. The number of times the line 1 − C
intersects this function determines the set of equilibria.
• If C < C < C, there is a none-make-AR equilibrium and at least two some-
make-AR equilibria.
• If C > C, none-make-AR is the unique equilibrium.
To simplify the presentation, the boundary cases C = C and C = C are ignored. In
Figure 4·4, we illustrate how the AR cost defines the set of equilibria. We use the
same system as in Example 6.
4.4 Comparison of Information Sharing Policies
In this section, we assume that the provider is interested to persuade as many
customers as possible to make reservations. We resort to simulations to find out
which policy maximizes the average number of reservations. We consider the full-
information, partial-information policies and the binary-information policy (which
has the same outcome as the no-information policy). Procedure 1 details the simu-
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Procedure 1 Information-sharing Simulation(N, τ e, PD)
j ← 1 {index}
DAR ← 0 {number of reservations}
D ← random variable from PD {the demand}
t ∈ RD ← vector with random values from U [0, 1] {arrival times}
Sort t in ascending order {sorting from the first customer that makes an inquiry
to the last}
while j ≤ min{D,N} do {iterate over all customers or until all servers are re-
served}
if tj < τ
e
N−j+1 then {if the arrival time is smaller than the appropriate thresh-
old}
D˜AR ← D˜AR + 1 {choosing AR}
j ← j + 1 {increase the index by 1}
else
break {if a customer is better off choosing AR′, then all customers that arrive
after him are also better off choosing AR′}
end if
end while
return DAR
lation steps at each iteration.
4.4.1 Simulation Results
We first examine an overloaded system where the demand is Poisson distributed
with mean λ = 15, while the number of servers is N = 10. Using Eq. (4.48), we get
that C = 1 − piN(0) = 0.342. We evaluate the performance of the difference policies
for seven different reservation costs between 0 and C.
For all costs in this range, all policies have a unique some-make-AR equilibrium.
Each point is computed by averaging out results over 10, 000 iterations. As shown in
Figure 4·5(a), for each AR cost, the policy that maximizes the number of reservations
is the binary-information policy. The full-information policy performs the worst, and
the performance of the partial-information policy performs better as M (the threshold
at which information starts to be shared) decreases.
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The simulation results also indicate that the gap between the outcomes of the
different policies increases as the AR cost increases. When the cost is low, the mo-
tivation to make reservations is high and almost all servers are reserved, regardless
of the policy. As the cost increases, the different information sharing policies have
larger impact on customers’ decisions. For example, when the cost is C = 0.34, the
average number of reservation is 20 times higher with the binary-information policy
than with the full-information policy.
Next, we consider an underloaded system with mean demand λ = 8. This time,
we use six different prices between 0 and C = 0.053. Figure 4·5(b) shows similar
results as Figure 4·5(a).
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(a) Average demand λ = 15.
(b) Average demand λ = 8.
(c) Average demand of λ = 10.
Figure 4·5: A comparison between the number of customers making
AR in a system with N = 10 servers. As less information is shared,
more customers are likely to make AR.
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Finally, we set the mean demand to λ = 10 and explore the case of multiple
equilibria (i.e., AR costs larger than C). In this case, the full-information policy
yields zero reservations (see Theorem 8). We run simulation to compare between
the performance of the binary-information and the partial-information policies. We
choose different AR costs in the range [0.215, 0.228]. In order to compare performance
when multiple equilibria exist, we always choose the one that leading to the largest
expected number of reservations. As shown in Fig. 4·5(c), the results follow the
same pattern as in the previous simulations, namely as less information is shared, the
number of reservations increases.
4.4.2 Numerical Example
To better understand the gap between the outcomes of the full-information and
binary-information policies, we return to Example 3.
Example 7. Consider the demand distribution of Example 3. By Eq. (4.3), the
probability of service of the threshold customer in the binary-information model is
pino−info(τ) =
3 + 3(1− τ)− (1− τ)2
3 + 6(1− τ)− 3(1− τ)2 . (4.59)
In Figure 4·6, we plot pi2(τ), pi1(τ) and pino−info(τ). We can see in the graph that
for any AR cost in (0, 0.167), at equilibrium, τ e (which is the fraction of customers
making AR in a game with binary-information) is much closer to τ e2 than to τ
e
1 . That
means that when sharing information, we dramatically decrease the probability that
the first customer making an inquiry will choose AR, while we only slightly increase
the probability that the second customer will choose AR (assuming the first one chose
AR). Thus, we can expect that the average number of reservations will be higher when
binary-information (or no-information) is shared.
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Figure 4·6: The probability of service of the threshold customers as
a function of the thresholds. The fact that τ e is much closer to τ e2
than to τ e1 explains why the number of reservations is larger with the
binary-information policy than with the full-information policy.
Based on the simulation results and this example, we make the following conjec-
ture:
Conjecture 10. In AR games, sharing no information about the number of available
servers maximizes the average number of reservations.
4.5 Summary
In this section, we focus on the impact of information on the strategic behavior of
customers in a slotted loss queue that allows advance reservations. We first show
that if the AR cost is applied only to customers getting service, then informing cus-
tomers that servers are available or hiding this information lead to the same equilibria.
Then, we find the equilibria structure under a full-information policy is being used.
We show that customers are less likely to make AR as they observe more available
servers. In order to lower the probability that the system will stay empty, we suggest
the partial-information policy and find its equilibrium structure. Using simulation,
we show that indeed, the number of customers making AR increases when using the
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partial-information policy compering to full-information policy. However, the pol-
icy that maximizes the fraction of customers making AR is the binary-information
policy. From the simulation results, we also infer that the customers’ behavior is
more sensitive to changes in the information disclosure policy as the reservation cost
increases.
The results indicate that in order for a full-information policy to be beneficial to
the service provider, the provider must encourage customers to make reservations also
when all or almost all servers are available. For example, in entertainment events,
customers have such motivation since they can choose better seats as they buy the
ticket earlier.
Chapter 5
Waiting Queues with Advance
Reservations
In this chapter, we switch our focus from loss queues to waiting queues. As in the
previous chapters, our objective is twofold. First, we study the behavior of strategic
customers and find the equilibrium structure of the game. Then, we analyze the
problem from the perspective of a service provider aiming to maximize her revenue
from AR fees.
5.1 Game Description
We consider a preemptive-resume M/D/1 queue that supports advance reservations.
In our model, there is a reservation period which covers [−T, 0] and is open for
reservations from time −T until time 0. Each customer k = 1, 2, ... is associated with
a request time −T ≤ tk ≤ 0 and a desired service starting time (shortly noted as
arrival time) sk > 0. That is, if t1 < t2, then customer 1 has the opportunity to
reserve the server before customer 2. If s1 < s2, then customer 1 wants to be served
earlier than customer 2. The service period starts only after the reservation period
ends. The request time can be interpreted as how much time in advance a customer
realizes that he will need service at a future time point.
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The request times are derived from a general continuous distribution with cumu-
lative distribution function F (·). The arrivals follow a Poisson process with rate λ.
The service time is 1/µ and we assume that µ > λ.
Each customer, at his request time, decides whether to make a reservation or not.
We denote those two actions by AR and AR′, respectively. If a customer makes a
reservation but his desired service time is already reserved, the nearest future available
time will be reserved for him. A customer that does not make a reservation is served
on a first-come-first-served basis along periods of times over which the server is not
reserved.
Customers do not know in advance what will be their waiting time if making or
if not making AR. Their decisions are based on statistical information which is the
values of λ, µ and F .
The cost of each customer consists of the reservation cost C (if making AR) and
the cost of waiting which is a linear function of the waiting time. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the cost of waiting is equal to the waiting time. Note that
the waiting time when making AR is smaller than when not making AR. However,
it may be greater than zero, since it is possible that the server is already reserved
at the desired service time. For simplification, we assume that the service period is
long enough such that we can ignore the transient phase before the queue reaches its
steady state.
In a preemptive-resume queue, if a job is interrupted, then it later resumes and
is not restarted. Due to this property, if the server is idle and a customer is waiting
for service, he will be served even if service cannot be completed due to an existing
reservation (in this case his service will be preempted and later resumed). Hence,
supporting advance reservations in a preemptive-resume queue does not impact the
utilization of the server which is ρ = λ/µ. Figure 5·1 illustrates the model.
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Figure 5·1: An illustration of the model with three customers. Cus-
tomer 1 makes a reservation at time t1, and he is served upon arrival
at s1. Customer 2 also makes AR and is served upon arrival, but
his service is preempted by customer 1 which made reservation earlier.
Customer 3 is served only when the service of customer 2 is completed.
5.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We can analyze this system as a priority queue where a priority between 0 (lowest
priority) and 1 (highest priority) is assigned to each customer. A customer with
request time t has priority 0 if not making AR and priority p = 1−F (t) if making AR.
Customers that share the same priority are served on a first-come-first-served basis.
We refer to p as the potential priority. Due to the probability integral transformation
theorem (Dodge, 2006, p. 320), we know that p is a random variable, uniformly
distributed in [0, 1].
Since customers are statistically identical, we consider only symmetrical behavior.
Thus, a decision of a tagged customer is a mapping of his potential priority p to
the probability of making AR. We denote this strategy function by σ(p). Consider a
tagged customer with potential priority p. We define W (·) to be a mapping of the
strategy followed by the rest of the customers and the priority of the tagged customer
to his expected waiting time. Thus, the expected waiting time of the tagged customer
is W (σ, p) if he makes AR and W (σ, 0) otherwise. Since customers are strategic, a
customer with potential priority p will make AR only if
W (σ, p) + C ≤ W (σ, 0). (5.1)
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Next, we define a threshold strategy and show that this is the only strategy that
can lead to equilibria.
Definition 10. Let τ ∈ (0, 1]. A strategy function σ(p) is said to be a threshold
strategy if it satisfies
σ(p) =
{
1 if p > τ,
0 if p ≤ τ.
Lemma 12. At equilibrium, all customers follow a threshold strategy.
Proof. Consider any strategy function σ. Since the expected waiting time is non-
increasing with the priority, there is either a single potential priority, or an interval
of potential priorities, or no potential priority such that
W (σ, p) + C = W (σ, 0). (5.2)
Note that the left hand side of Eq. (5.2) is the expected cost if making AR, while the
right hand side is the expected cost if not making AR. If Eq. (5.2) holds for a single
value p′, then a customer with potential priority greater (respectively, smaller) than
p′ is better off making (respectively, not making) AR. Therefore, σ is an equilibrium
strategy only if it is a threshold strategy with threshold τ = p′.
If Eq. (5.2) holds for an interval of values [p′, p′′], then all customers with potential
priority p ∈ [p′, p′′] do not make AR (otherwise, W (σ, p) would not be a constant over
that interval). Therefore, σ is an equilibrium strategy only if it is a threshold strategy,
with threshold τ = p′.
Finally, suppose that Eq. (5.2) does not hold for any p ∈ [0, 1]. If W (σ, p) + C <
W (σ, 0) for all p ∈ [0, 1], then all customers are better off not making AR. Therefore,
σ is an equilibrium strategy only if it is a threshold strategy, with threshold τ = 1.
Note that a situation where W (σ, p)+C > W (σ, 0) for all p ∈ [0, 1] does not exist,
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since a user with potential priority zero has the same expected waiting time if making
or avoiding AR.
Next, we define two types of equilibria.
Definition 11. An equilibrium strategy with threshold τ is called a some-make-AR
equilibrium if τ < 1.
Definition 12. An equilibrium strategy with threshold τ is called a none-make-AR
equilibrium if τ = 1.
Since the structure of the equilibrium depends on the reservation cost, we aim
to determine the equilibrium to which a given cost leads. Given that all customers
follow a threshold strategy, we define a threshold customer to be a customer with
potential priority equals exactly to the threshold followed by all other customers.
Given a strategy with threshold τ , a threshold customer that makes AR observes
three priority classes:
1. A lower priority class which contains all customers with priority smaller than
his (none of them makes AR). The arrival rate of customers belonging to this
class is λτ .
2. His own priority class which contains only himself (since the potential priority is
a continuous random variable, the probability that two customers will have the
same potential priority is zero). Thus, the arrival rate of customers belonging
to this class is 0.
3. A higher priority class which contains all customers with greater priority (they
all made AR before he did). The arrival rate of customers belonging to this
class is λ(1− τ).
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If the threshold customer does not make AR, he only observes two classes:
1. His own priority class which also contains all customers with priority smaller
than his. The arrival rate of customers belonging to this class is λτ .
2. A higher priority class which contains all customers with greater priority. The
arrival rate of customers belonging to this class is λ(1− τ).
By applying the known formula of the waiting time in an M/G/1 queue with
preemptive-resume priorities (Conway et al., 2012, p.175), we obtain the following:
1. If the threshold customer makes AR, then his expected waiting time is
WAR(τ) =
µ− λ
2
(1− τ)
(µ− λ (1− τ))2 −
1
µ
. (5.3)
2. If the threshold customer does not make AR, then his expected waiting time is
WAR′(τ) =
µ− λ
2
(µ− λ (1− τ)) (µ− λ) −
1
µ
. (5.4)
The condition for threshold τ < 1 to be a some-make-AR equilibrium is
C +WAR(1) = WAR′(1). (5.5)
That is, a customer with potential priority equals to the threshold is indifferent be-
tween the two actions. The condition for threshold τ = 1 to be a none-make-AR
equilibrium is
C +WAR(τ) ≥ WAR′(τ). (5.6)
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That is, a customer with potential priority 1 (and hence, all customers) are better off
not making AR.
By isolating C in Eq. (5.5), we define C(τ) to be a function that maps a threshold
to the AR cost that leads to that threshold
C(τ) , λ · µ · τ
2 (µ− λ) · (µ− λ (1− τ))2 . (5.7)
We conclude that given cost C, the threshold τe ∈ (0, 1) represents a some-make-AR
equilibrium if and only if C = C(τe). The threshold τe = 1 represents a none-make-
AR equilibrium if and only if C ≥ C(1). In order to find the equilibria structure, we
next find the properties of C(τ).
Lemma 13. If ρ ≤ 1/2, then C(τ) is a monotonically increasing function. If ρ > 1/2,
then C(τ) is a unimodal function with a global maximum.
Proof. First, we compute the derivative of C(τ):
dC
dτ
=
λµ (λ (1 + τ)− µ)
2 (λ− µ) (µ− λ (1− τ))3 . (5.8)
Since the denominator is negative for any τ , the sign of the derivative is determined by
the sign of λ (1 + τ)−µ. If ρ ≤ 1/2, then this expression is negative for any τ ∈ (0, 1)
and the derivative of C(τ) is positive for any τ ∈ (0, 1). If ρ > 1/2, then the derivative
of C(τ) is positive for any τ < (µ − λ)/λ; is equal to zero at τ = (µ − λ)/λ; and
negative otherwise. Thus, for any value of ρ > 1/2, C(τ) is unimodal with a global
maximum.
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Next, we define:
C , C(1) = λ
2µ (µ− λ) , (5.9)
and
C , µ
8 (λ− µ)2 . (5.10)
Note that if ρ ≤ 0.5, then C is the maximum value of C(τ) and if ρ > 0.5, then C is
the maximum value of C(τ). We can now state the main result of this chapter:
Theorem 11. The game has the following equilibrium structure.
When ρ < 1/2:
• If C < C, then there is a unique some-make-AR equilibrium.
• If C > C, then there is a unique none-make-AR equilibrium.
When ρ > 1/2:
• If C < C, then there is a unique some-make-AR equilibrium.
• If C < C < C, then there are two some-make-AR equilibria and a none-make-
AR equilibrium.
• If C > C, then there is a unique none-make-AR equilibrium.
Proof. We begin with ρ ≤ 0.5. If C < C, then there is a single value of τ such that
C = C(τ) has a solution. Hence, there is one some-make-AR equilibrium. A none-
make-AR equilibrium does not exist since C(1) > C. If C > C, then there is no value
of τ such that C = C(τ) has a solution. Hence, a some-make-AR equilibrium does
not exist. On the other hand, a none-make-AR equilibrium exists since C > C(1).
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Figure 5·2: C(τ) when ρ > 0.5. The number and types of equilibria
is determined by the value of C
Next, consider ρ > 0.5. In the range [0, C], the function C(τ) is monotonically
increasing. Thus, if C ∈ [0, C], then there is a single value of τ such that C = C(τ)
has a solution, and hence there is one some-make-AR equilibrium. In the range
[C,C], the function C(τ) is unimodal. Thus, if C ∈ [C,C], then there exist two
values of τ that solve C = C(τ), and hence there are two some-make-AR equilibria.
The condition for the existence of a none-make-AR equilibrium is the same as in the
case of ρ ≤ 0.5.
In Figure 5·2, we plot C(τ) as defined in Eq. (5.7) for a queue with parameters
λ = 18 and µ = 20. Given the AR cost C, the equilibrium structure is determined
by the number of times C intersects the function C(τ).
5.3 Revenue Maximization
In this section, we assume that the AR cost is a fee determined by the service provider.
Our goal is to find which fee maximizes the provider revenue from AR fees. The
revenue per time unit, at equilibrium with threshold τe, is the number of customers
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making AR multiplied by the AR fee that leads to that equilibrium. The expected
revenue is
R(τe) = λ(1− τe)C(τe)
=
λ2(1− τe)τeµ
2(µ− λ)(λ(τe − 1) + µ)2 . (5.11)
With some manipulation, we get that the revenue function does not depend on
the values of λ and µ but only on the utilization ρ:
R(τe) =
ρ(1− τe)τe
2(1− ρ)(1 + ρ(τe − 1))2 . (5.12)
At first glance, this result seems surprising since it implies that the revenue does
not increase when scaling the system (i.e., increasing both arrival and service rates).
However, in an M/D/1 queue, the waiting time decreases as the system gets larger,
and hence customers are less motivated to make AR. Therefore, scaling the system
has a trade off. For a given threshold, as we scale the system, more customers will
make AR but they will pay a smaller fee.
By solving the equation dR/dτe = 0, we find that the optimal threshold is
τ ∗e = (1− ρ)/(2− ρ). By substituting τ ∗e into Eq. (5.7), we get that the optimal
fee is
C∗ =
λ(2µ− λ)
8µ(µ− λ)2 . (5.13)
Similarly, by substituting τ ∗e into Eq. (5.12), we get that the maximum possible
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revenue is
R∗ =
ρ2
8(1− ρ)2 . (5.14)
If ρ ≤ 0.5, then setting the AR fee to C = C∗ maximizes the provider revenue.
However, if ρ > 0.5, this fee may lead to multiple equilibria, including one with no
reservations. From Theorem 11, a none-make-AR equilibrium exists if C∗ > C. From
Eq. (5.9) and Eq. (5.13), we deduce that if
λ(2µ− λ)
8µ(µ− λ)2 >
λ
2µ (µ− λ) , (5.15)
then C∗ leads to multiple equilibria (including a none-make-AR equilibrium). One
can show that the inequality above holds only if ρ > 2/3. We conclude with the
following corollary, which is illustrated in Figure 5·3.
Corollary 3. The revenue maximizing fee C∗ leads to a unique some-make-AR equi-
librium if ρ < 2/3 and to multiple equilibria, including a none-make-AR equilibrium,
otherwise.
5.3.1 Price of Conservatism
Assuming that ρ > 2/3, the provider can either be risk-averse and charge a fee that
leads to a unique equilibrium with guaranteed revenue, or it can be risk-taking and
charge a higher fee that may lead to greater revenue but also to zero revenue. To
compare between the two options, we use the Price of Conservatism (PoC) metric,
which was introduced in Chapter 3. PoC is the ratio between the maximum possible
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(a) λ = 38, µ = 60 (b) λ = 45, µ = 60
Figure 5·3: When the utilization ρ < 2/3, the optimal fee C∗ leads to
a unique equilibrium (a). When ρ > 2/3, C∗ leads to multiple equilibria
(b).
revenue R∗ and the maximum guaranteed revenue R∗g, which is defined as follows.
R∗g = max
0<τe<1
R(τe).
s.t. C(τe) < C. (5.16)
Since R(τe) has exactly one extreme point (which is τ
∗
e ), it is increasing in the
range [0, τ ∗e ). Therefore, the maximum guaranteed revenue is achieved when choosing
the largest τe for which C(τe) < C. In other words, C should be slightly smaller than
C. By solving C(τ) = C, we get two solutions: τ 1e = 1 and
τ 2e =
(
1− ρ
ρ
)2
. (5.17)
By substituting τ 2e into Eq. (5.12), we get
R∗g =
2ρ− 1
2(1− ρ) , (5.18)
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Figure 5·4: The maximum possible revenue and the maximum guar-
anteed revenue in a system with parameters λ = 45 and µ = 60.
and by dividing R∗ by R∗g, we get
PoC =
ρ2
−8ρ2 + 12ρ− 4 . (5.19)
We conclude with the following theorem.
Theorem 12. If ρ < 2/3, then PoC = 1. Else, PoC = ρ
2
−8ρ2+12ρ−4 .
Figure 5·4 shows the maximum possible revenue and the maximum guaranteed
revenue in a system with parameters λ = 45 and µ = 60. It can be seen in the figure
that for those parameters, the difference between the two values is quite small. Thus,
being risk averse seems preferable in this case.
By computing the derivative of PoC with respect to ρ, we get that for any ρ > 2/3
dPoC
dρ
=
ρ(3ρ− 2)
4(2ρ2 − 3ρ+ 1)2 > 0 (5.20)
Thus, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 4. The price of conservatism increases with the utilization.
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That is, as the utilization increases, the ratio of the provider’s revenue when she is
risk-averse to the potential revenue when she is risk-taking increases as well.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we analyze a preemptive-resume M/D/1 queue that supports advance
reservations. First, we find the equilibrium structure and show that if the utilization of
the queue is smaller than 0.5, then the equilibrium is unique. Otherwise, the number
of equilibria depends on the AR cost. We then study the revenue maximization
problem, assuming that the AR cost is a fee charged by the provider. We show that if
the utilization is smaller than 2/3, then the revenue-maximizing fee leads to a unique
equilibrium. Otherwise, the fee that leads to the maximum possible revenue also
leads to an equilibrium with no revenue. Finally, we show that the ratio between
the maximum possible revenue and maximum guaranteed revenue (PoC) increases
unboundedly when the utilization of the queue approaches 1.
Chapter 6
Dynamic AR Games
In this chapter, we study a dynamic version of AR games. We consider two AR
models: a loss queue with no information sharing (which was analyzed in Chapter
3) and a waiting queue (which was analyzed in the previous chapter). Since the
equilibrium structure of the waiting queue model is more explicit than the equilibrium
structure of the loss queue model, we focus on the former. Towards the end of this
chapter, we explain how the results obtained for the waiting queue model can be
extended the loss queue model.
6.1 Preliminaries and Learning Process
In dynamic games (also known as learning models, since players learn over time the
behavior of other players), it is assumed that the game repeats many times and that
initially customers do not necessarily follow an equilibrium strategy. The goal is to
find the long-term behavior of the customers. In our analysis, we use a best response
dynamic model which is rooted in Cournot study of duopoly (Cournot, 1897). In this
section, we describe the learning model.
At each game (step) a new set of customers participate. The learning process
begins with an initial strategy function σ. All customers believe that this strategy
will be followed by all other customers. We refer to this initial strategy as the initial
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belief.
Next, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. Customers that are indifferent between actions AR and AR′ choose
action AR’.
Based on this assumption, and using the proof of Lemma 12, one can show that the
best response of all customers to any initial belief is a threshold strategy.
We are interested to study the long-term outcomes of a dynamic game. In order
to simplify the analysis and since a threshold strategy is followed at all steps, we
assume the following.
Assumption 4. The initial belief is a threshold strategy.
We denote the threshold of the strategy followed at step i ≥ 1 by τi ∈ [0, 1]
Customers observe the proportion of customers that choose AR at the previous step
and use it to estimate the strategy that was followed at that step. We denote the
estimation of τi by τˆi. If the demand and the number of reservations at step i are Di
and DiAR respectively, then
τˆi = 1− D
AR
i
Di
. (6.1)
We distinguish between two types of learning:
1. Strategy learning. In this type of learning, it is assumed that at each step
i, τˆi = τi. That is, customers observe past strategies rather than actions. This
can occur when the sample size (i.e., the number of customers at each step) is
large.
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2. Action learning. In this type of learning, if the threshold followed by all
customers at step i is not 0 or 1, then there is a strictly positive probability
that τˆi 6= τi.
We use a generalized version of best response dynamics, presented in (Thorlund-
Petersen, 1990). In this version, at each step, customers form a belief about the
strategy that will be used by other customers at the current step. The belief at step i
is constructed based on the previous belief and the last observation. Hence, the belief
at step i is
βi = βi−1(1− δ) + τˆi−1δ,
τˆ1 = β1, (6.2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter that defines the weight of the new observation com-
pared to the previous belief, and β1 represents the initial belief.
Since the best response of all customers to any belief is a threshold strategy, we
can define a joint best response function BR : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. The input is a belief
about the threshold strategy that will be followed by all customers. The output is
the best response threshold to that belief. Thus, we can describe the best response
dynamics of the game as the following process:
τi = BR (βi−1(1− δ) + τˆi−1δ) . (6.3)
Note that under strategy-learning this process is deterministic, while under action-
learning this process is a stochastic Markov process (Gardiner et al., 1985, Chapter
3).
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6.2 Learning Analysis
In this section, we focus on the behavior of customers at a given step. Thus, we
remove the subscript i. We begin the analysis with the following observations:
(i) Given a belief β (i.e., assuming that all other customers follow the threshold
β), if a tagged customer with potential priority p > β chooses AR, then all
customers with potential priority greater than his will have higher priority and
all customers with potential priority smaller than his will have lower priority.
Therefore, his (believed) expected waiting time is equal to the expected waiting
time of a threshold customer that chooses AR in a system where all customers
follow the threshold p. Hence,
W (β, p) = WAR(p) if p ≥ β, (6.4)
where WAR(·) is defined in Eq. (5.3).
(ii) Given a belief β, if a tagged customer with potential priority p < β chooses AR,
then his (believed) expected waiting time is the same as the expected waiting
time of the threshold customer (recall that each customer assumes that he is
the only one deviating). Hence,
W (β, p) = WAR(β) if p < β. (6.5)
(iii) The expected waiting time of all customers that choose AR′ are equal. Hence,
W (β, 0) = WAR′(β) ∀p ∈ [0, 1], (6.6)
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where WAR′(·) is defined in Eq. (5.4).
Those properties will be used later to prove our main results.
Next, we show that the best response to a given belief β is determined by the sign
of WAR(β) +C −WAR′(β). That is, the system behave differently if a customer that
has a potential priority equals to the belief β is better off choosing AR or AR′.
We split the belief range [0, 1] to a set of intervals where in each interval either
WAR(β) +C > WAR′(β) or WAR(β) +C < WAR′(β). Thus, the range [0, 1] is split by
the set of β values for which
WAR(β) + C = WAR′(β). (6.7)
We use the following notations to distinguish between the two types of intervals.
Definition 13. An interval I is called AR-interval, if for any belief β ∈ I
WAR(β) + C −WAR′(β) < 0. (6.8)
Definition 14. An interval Iis called AR’-interval, if for any belief β ∈ I
WAR(β) + C −WAR′(β) > 0. (6.9)
As was explained in the previous chapter, WAR(0) + C > WAR′(0). Hence, the first
interval (i.e., the interval with endpoint β = 0) is an AR’-interval. For simplification,
we ignore the boundary case where the two expected cost functions are tangent to
each other. Thus, any two adjacent intervals are of different types. In Figure 6·1, we
illustrate the different intervals in a game with a unique equilibrium and in a game
with multiple equilibria.
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(a) C = 0.02. One some-make-AR equilib-
rium.
(b) C = 0.03. Two some-make-AR equilib-
ria.
Figure 6·1: An example with λ = 45 and µ = 60. The some-make-
AR equilibria split the belief range to intervals. At each interval, one
expected cost is smaller than the other.
In the following two lemmas, we separately characterize the best response of cus-
tomers to a belief belonging to an AR’-interval and to that belonging to an AR-
interval. We show that in the former case, the best response strategy is greater than
the belief but still belongs to the same interval. In the latter case, the best response
is 0, that is, all customers make AR.
By computing the derivative of WAR(β) and WAR′(β), one can verify that both
functions are decreasing with β. This property will be used in the proofs of both
lemmas.
Lemma 14. If a belief β belongs to AR’-interval I, then
(i) BR(β) > β;
(ii) BR(β) ∈ I.
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Proof. First, we consider the case
WAR(1) + C > WAR′(β). (6.10)
Since WAR(·) and WAR′(·) are decreasing functions and by Eq. (6.10), we deduce
that the two expected cost functions do not intersect at any point greater than β.
Therefore, β belongs to the last interval (i.e., an interval with endpoint β = 1). Given
Eq. (6.4) and Eq. (6.5), and since WAR(·) is decreasing, we deduce that the expected
cost of all customers that make AR is at least WAR(1) + C. Given that Eq. (6.10)
holds, we deduce that no customer will make AR and the best response to β is τ = 1.
Thus, for this case, part (i) and (ii) hold.
If Eq. (6.10) does not hold, then there exists a unique value η ∈ [β, 1) such that
WAR(η) + C = WAR′(β). (6.11)
From Eq. (6.4) and Eq. (6.5), one can see that the expected costs of a customer with
potential priority smaller than η is greater than WAR(η)+C if he chooses AR. Hence,
he is better off choosing AR′. The expected cost of a customer with potential priority
greater than η, if choosing AR, is at most WAR(η) + C, and hence he is better off
choosing AR. Thus, the best response of all customers is τ = η ≥ β.
We have shown that τ ≥ β. Next, we prove part (ii) of the lemma. Let
I = (I−, I+). We need to show that τ < I+. Assume by contradiction that τ > I+.
Since both WAR(·) and WAR′(·) are decreasing functions and based on Eq. (6.11), we
deduce that the following must hold:
WAR′(I
+) < WAR(τ) + C = WAR′(β) < WAR(I
+) + C. (6.12)
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Sine I+ is an equilibrium point, Eq. (6.12) contradicts Eq. (5.5).
Lemma 15. If the belief β belongs to an AR-interval, then BR(β) = 0
Proof. Based on Eqs. (6.4) and (6.5) and since WAR(·) is a decreasing function, we
deduce that
W (β, p) ≤ WAR(β), ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. (6.13)
From Eq. (6.8) and Eq. (6.13), we deduce that
W (β, p) + C < WAR′(β), ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. (6.14)
That is, all customers are better off choosing AR and the best response to β is
τ = 0.
6.3 Stability Analysis
Using Lemma 14 and Lemma 15, we analyze the different equilibria in terms of
stability. The stability analysis helps in establishing the long-term behavior of the
dynamical system. We start by adapting the definitions of stability presented in
(Fudenberg, 1998) to our model.
Definition 15. A strategy with threshold τ is a steady-state strategy if and only if
P (τi=τ |β1=τ)=1,∀i > 0.
That is, only if the initial belief is being followed at all future steps, then it is a
steady state. The definition implies that in order for a strategy to be a steady-state
strategy it is necessary that it will be an equilibrium strategy but it is not a sufficient
condition.
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Definition 16. A strategy with threshold τ is a stable steady-state strategy if it is
a steady-state strategy and in addition, for every neighborhood θ of τ (which is any
interval in [0, 1] that contains τ) there exists a neighborhood θ1 ∈ θ of τ such that if
β1 ∈ θ1, then τi ∈ θ, ∀i > 0.
That is, if the initial belief is close enough to the steady-state, it remains nearby.
A steady-state strategy that is not stable is referred to as an unstable steady-state
strategy.
Definition 17. A strategy with threshold τ is an asymptotically stable steady-state
strategy if it is stable and in addition, there exists a neighborhood θ of τ such that if
β1 ∈ θ, then limi→∞ τi = τ .
That is, if the initial belief is close enough to the steady-state, it will eventually
converge to it.
First, we note that due to the stochastic nature of action-learning, a some-make-
AR equilibrium is not a steady-state under action-learning. That is, even if at some
point all customers follow an equilibrium strategy, with some probability, the fraction
of customers choosing each action will defer from that strategy. In this case, it is not
guaranteed that the equilibrium strategy will be followed in the next stage. Thus,
under action-learning, the game can only converge to a none-make-AR equilibrium (if
it exists). Under strategy-learning, all equilibria are steady-states. Thus, all equilibria
are candidates for convergence. However, in the next section, we will show that if
three equilibria exist, the game can only converge to two of them.
In the remaining of this section, we classify each equilibrium according to Defini-
tions 15-17. Using Lemmas 14 and 15, we obtain the following results.
Theorem 13. under strategy-learning, a some-make-AR is an unstable steady-state
equilibrium.
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Proof. Consider a some-make-AR equilibrium with threshold τ e. Let θ = [τ e−γ, τ e+
γ], where 0 < γ < τ e (i.e., 0 /∈ θ). Given any neighborhood θ1 ∈ θ of τ e and a belief
β ∈ θ1, it follows by Lemma 15 that either the best response to any β < τe is 0 or
the best response to any β > τe is 0. Hence, θ does not contain a sub neighborhood
of τ e, such that the best response to any belief in this sub-neighborhood is in θ.
This contradicts Definition 16. We conclude that a some-make-AR equilibrium is an
unstable steady-state.
Theorem 14. Under both strategy-learning and action-learning, if a none-make-AR
equilibrium exists, then it is an asymptotically stable steady-state equilibrium.
Proof. With both strategy-learning and action-learning, if at some step i, βi = 1 and
none-make-AR is an equilibrium, then at all future steps all customers will keep not
making AR. Thus, it is a steady-state.
Next, we show that under action-learning, a none-make-AR equilibrium is an
asymptotically stable steady-state. Strategy-learning can be seen as a special case of
action-learning where the estimators are always exact. Thus, it is sufficient to prove
the result for action-learning only.
Let θ be a neighborhood of 1. Under action-learning, a steady-state is stable only
if there is a neighborhood of 1 θ1 ∈ θ , such that the best response to any threshold
strategy in θ1 is a none-make-AR strategy. If a none-make-AR equilibrium exists,
then C +WAR(1) > WAR′(1). Since WAR′(·) is a continuous function, we deduce that
there exists θ1 such that, for any ν ∈ θ1, C+WAR(1) > WAR′(ν). In other words, the
best response strategy to a belief βi ∈ θ1 is τi = 1. Thus, βi+1 > βi, and hence also
τi+1 = 1. By induction, we conclude that the belief converges to 1. Hence, we have
shown that if a none-make-AR is an equilibrium, then any neighborhood of 1 has a
110
sub-neighborhood of 1 θ1 such that if β1 ∈ θ1, then limi→∞ βi = 1, and therefore it is
is an asymptotically stable steady-state.
In Table 6.1, we summarize the results of this section. In the next two sections,
we use the results we obtained so far to separately analyze the dynamics of a system
with a unique equilibrium and a system with multiple equilibria.
Strategy-learning Action-learning
Some-make-AR
equilibrium
An unstable
steady-state
Not a steady-state
None-make-AR
equilibrium
An asymptotically
stable steady-state
An asymptotically
stable steady-state
Table 6.1: Stability summary.
6.4 The Dynamics of a Game with Unique Equilibrium
In this section, we assume that C < C. Thus, the game has a unique some-make-
AR equilibrium with threshold τ e. Hence, there are two intervals IAR , [0, τ e) and
IAR′ , (τ e, 1].
6.4.1 Strategy-learning
Using the analysis of a single step which we carried at the previous sections, we next
show that regardless of the initial belief, the customers’ strategy always converges to
τ e.
Theorem 15. Under strategy-learning, convergence to the unique some-make-AR
equilibrium is guaranteed.
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Proof. We split the proof into two cases. In the first case, we assume that β1 ∈ IAR′ .
From Lemma 14, we deduce that τ1 ∈ (β1, τ e]. Since for any weight δ, β2 ∈ (β, τ1], we
deduce that if β2 6= τ e, then β2 ∈ IAR′ . By induction, we deduce that, for any j > 0,
τj ≥ βj ≥ βj−1, (6.15)
τj ≤ τ e. (6.16)
The set {τi, i = 1, 2...} is a monotonically increasing sequence bounded by τ e. Thus,
it has a limit, denoted by L. From Eq. (6.2), we deduce that limi→∞ βi → L, and
hence limi→∞BR(βi) = L. We conclude that the limit L is a fixed point of BR, and
hence it must be the equilibrium point τ e.
In the second case, we assume that β1 belongs to the second interval. Therefore,
based on Lemma 15, τ1 = 0 and β2 ∈ [0, β1). If β2 ∈ IAR′ , then the strategy will
converge to τ e as we showed earlier in the proof. If not, then τ2 = 0. In this case,
β3 ∈ [0, β2). By induction, we deduce that if at step i > 1 the belief still belongs to
IAR, then
βi = β1(1− δ)i−1. (6.17)
This guarantees that for some i ≥ 2, βi ∈ IAR′ and the strategy must converge to
τ e.
6.4.2 Action-learning
Since some-make-AR equilibrium is not a steady-state under action-learning, the
customers’ strategy does not converge to an equilibrium. Next, we show that, at each
step, all customers follow a strategy with threshold between 0 and τ e. Thus, the
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expected number of customers making AR, at each step, is greater than in a system
where all customers follow the equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 16. In a dynamic game with a unique some-make-AR equilibrium, the
average number of customers making AR under action-learning is greater than under
strategy-learning.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary step i and assume that action-learning is applied. If at
step i the belief βi belongs to an AR-interval, then all customers will choose AR. If βi
belongs to an AR’-interval, then τi ∈ (βi, τ e). Thus, in any realization, the strategy
followed by all customers in all steps is a random variable that takes values between
0 and τ e. In strategy-learning, the strategy followed by all customers converges to τ e.
Thus, the average fraction of customers not making AR converges to a value between
0 and τ e under action-learning and to τ e under strategy-learning.
Next, we present a simulated example that compares between the revenue in
the action-learning model and the strategy-learning model. The pseudo-code of the
simulation is given in Procedure 2.
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Procedure 2 Learning Simulation (λ, β1, C, δ, l)
for i← 1 to l {iterating over all steps} do
DAR ← 0 {the number of reservations}
D ← generate Poisson random variable {the number of customers}
for j ← 1 to D {iterating over all customers} do
p← generate random variable from U(0,1) {the potential priority}
if p > βi {check if the potential priority is greater than the current belief}
then
if WAR(p) +C < WAR′(βi) {check if the customer is better off making AR}
then
DAR ← DAR + 1{increase the number of reservations by one}
end if
else
if WAR(βi) +C < WAR′(βi) {check if the customer is better off making AR}
then
DAR ← DAR + 1 {increase the number of reservations by one}
end if
end if
end for
if startegy-learning then
τˆi ←
{
0 if βi > τ
e,
τ : WAR(τ) + C = WAR′(βi) if βi ≤ τ e,
{compute the current strategy}
end if
if action-learning then
τˆi ← 1− DARD {estimate the current strategy}
end if
βi+1 ← βi(1− δ) + τˆiδ {compute the new belief}
end for
Example 8. We consider a queue with parameters λ = 45 and µ = 60. We set the
AR cost to C = 0.024. The unique equilibrium is τ e = 0.1026 (i.e., on a static game,
on average, 89.74% of the customers make AR). We run a simulation of 10, 000 steps.
Each step lasts for one time unit (i.e., the average demand at each step is 45). We set
β1 = τ
e and δ = 1. The average number of reservations per time unit is 40.3 (i.e., on
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Figure 6·2: Simulation results. In a game with unique equilibrium,
more customers make AR under action-learning than under strategy-
learning.
average, 89.5% make AR) under strategy-learning and 42.7 (i.e., on average, 94.9%
make AR) under action-learning. We conclude that, as Theorem 15 states, when
customers base their decisions on historic actions and not strategies, more customers
make AR. Statistical analysis (one-tailed t-test) shows that the difference between
the mean number of reservations under action-learning and under strategy-learning
is statistically significant, with confidence level of 99%. In Figure 6·2, we plot the
number of reservations, under action-learning and under strategy-learning. We use
the same realization of customers in both cases and we can see that at each iteration,
the number of reservations is greater (or equal) when applying action-learning.
We conclude that if the provider interest is that as many customers as possible will
make reservations, then she is better off if customers gain information about previous
actions rather than strategies.
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6.5 The Dynamics of a Game with Multiple Equilibria
In this section, we assume that ρ > 0.5 and C < C < C. Thus, the game has two
some-make-AR equilibria and a none-make-AR equilibrium. We denote the smaller
and greater thresholds followed at the some-make-AR equilibria by τ e1 and τ
e
2 , re-
spectively. The three intervals are [0, τ e1 ), (τ
e
1 , τ
e
2 ) and (τ
e
2 , 1). Note that the first and
third intervals are AR’-intervals, while the second interval is an AR-interval.
6.5.1 Strategy-learning
Based on Lemma 14, Lemma 15 and the proof of Theorem 15, one can show that
when the initial belief belongs [0, τ e2 ] the game converges to τ
e
1 and when the initial
belief belonging to (τ e2 , 1] the game converges to 1.
Corollary 5. Under strategy-learning, a game with multiple equilibria converges to
τ e1 , if β1 < τ
e
2 , and to 1 otherwise.
Example 9. We consider the same system as described in Example 8. However,
this time, we set the AR cost to C = 0.032. For this cost, the set of equilibria
is {τ e1 = 0.222, τ e2 = 0.5, τ e3 = 1}. We set three different initial thresholds, each one
belongs to a different interval: β1 = 0.2, β2 = 0.4 and β3 = 0.6. We apply strategy-
learning with δ = 0.8. As Figure 6·3 shows, within a few steps, the system converges
to an equilibrium.
From Corollary 5, we deduce that if the initial belief is a random variable, then
with probability P(β1 < τ e2 ) the strategy converges to τ e1 and with probability 1 −
P(β1 < τ e2 ) it converges to one. Assuming that C is a fee charged by the provider, we
aim to determine which fee maximizes the average revenue from AR fees in a dynamic
game that repeats many times. By Corollary 5, the expected revenue depends on both
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Figure 6·3: Convergence to equilibrium under strategy-learning
τ e1 and τ
e
2 . Thus, the first step is to find the relation between those two thresholds.
By manipulating the equation C(τ e1 ) = C(τ
e
2 ), we get the following:
τ e2 =
(
1− ρ
ρ
)2
1
τ e1
. (6.18)
We denote the CDF of β1 by Fβ and the long-term excepted revenue of the dynamic
game (i.e., the expected revenue after convergence) by RD(τ
e
1 ). Using Eq. (6.18), we
obtain
RD(τ
e
1 ) = R(τ
e
1 )Fβ
((
1− ρ
ρ
)2
1
τ e1
)
+ 0 ·
(
1− Fβ
((
1− ρ
ρ
)2
1
τ e1
))
. (6.19)
Given Fβ, one can find, using Eq. (6.19) and Eq. (5.12), the value of τ
e
1 that
maximizes RD(τ
e
1 ) and, in turn, the optimal fee. Let assume that Fβ is uniformly
distributed in [0, 1]. In this case, RD(τ) becomes
RD(τ
e
1 ) =
(1− τ e1 )(1− ρ)
2ρ(1− ρ(τ e1 − 1))2
. (6.20)
By computing the derivative of RD(τ
e
1 ) with respect to τ
e
1 , one can show that
it decreases with τ e1 . Thus, we deduce that when considering a threshold which is
not unique (i.e., a threshold between ((1 − ρ)/ρ)2 and 1), the optimal threshold is
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((1− ρ)/ρ)2. Combining this result with Corollary 3 leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 17. Under strategy-learning, if the initial belief is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1, then the optimal fee is C when ρ > 2/3 and C∗ when ρ < 2/3.
6.5.2 Action-learning
Under action-learning, a system formed by a risk-taking provider has one steady-state
equilibrium which is a none-make-AR equilibrium. In this section, we show that in
some cases the system converges to this steady-state, while in other cases it cycles.
The long-term behavior is determined by the initial belief β1 and the weight δ.
Since none-make-AR equilibrium is an asymptotically stable steady-state there
exists ν > 0 such that if the belief at some step is in the range [ν, 1], then the
customers’ strategy converges to the none-make-AR equilibrium. Thus, we can con-
clude that regardless of the value of δ, if the initial belief is in the range [ν, 1], then
convergences to the none-make-AR equilibrium is guaranteed. The more interesting
question is how the system behaves when the initial belief is in the range [0, ν). Next,
we show that if δ = 1 (i.e., the belief is based only on the actions at the most recent
step), then convergence to equilibrium is guaranteed, regardless of the initial belief.
Theorem 18. Under action-learning, if δ = 1 and multiple equilibria exist, then the
system converges to a none-make-AR equilibrium with probability 1.
Proof. At each step in which τi > 0, there is a strictly positive probability that τˆi will
be in the range [ν, 1]. At the boundary case τi = 0, the probability that all customers
will choose AR′ is 0. However, τi = 0 is not an equilibrium, and hence in the next
step τi+1 will be greater than zero. Since the game repeats infinitely many times,
with probability 1, there exists a step j such that τˆj will be in the range [ν, 1]. Since
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βj+1 = τˆj when δ = 1, we have that τj+1 = 1. Thus, convergence to a none-make-AR
equilibrium is guaranteed.
Next, we show that if δ < 1, the strategy does not necessarily converge to a
none-make-AR equilibrium. We do it by the means of an example.
Example 10. Consider the same game as in Example 9 but with AR cost C = 0.028
and δ = 0.5. In this system, the set of equilibria is {0.142, 0.777, 1}. Starting with
an initial belief β1 < 0.777, the system can converge to 1 only if, at some point, the
belief will belong to the last interval (0.777, 1].
By Lemma 15, the best response to any belief belonging to (0.142, 0.777) is 0. Thus,
the belief needs to “jump” from the interval [0, 0.142] to the interval [0.777, 1]. This
cannot happen since the belief, at any step, cannot be greater than 0.142 ·0.5+1 ·0.5 =
0.571.
6.6 Learning in Loss systems
In this section, we consider a dynamic version of the loss queue game with no-
information sharing. As it turns out, the results of this variant are almost identical to
those of the dynamic waiting queue. To avoid repetition, we do not prove the results
for the loss queue. For formal proofs, see (Simhon et al., 2015)
First, we observe that the stability analysis is the same for both models. Thus,
Theorems 13 and 14 are also valid for the loss queue. Next, we separately analyze a
game with a unique some-make-AR equilibrium and a game with multiple equilibria
including a none-make-AR equilibrium. We begin by proving that there exists an AR
cost that leads to a unique some-make-AR equilibrium.
Lemma 16. For any number of servers and demand distribution, there exists a fee
for which the game has a unique some-make-AR equilibrium.
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Proof. Since for any threshold τ > 0, piAR(τ) > piAR′(τ) and since piAR(0) = piAR′(0)
(see Section 3.2.2), we deduce that there exists x ∈ [0, 1] such that f(t) , piAR(τ) −
piAR′(τ) is monotonically increasing in the range [0, x]. We define τmin = minx≤τ≤1 f(τ).
In case that the fee C is set such that (1−C)piAR(τmin) > piAR′(τmin), then the two cost
functions intersect once. In this case, the following holds: (1− C)piAR(1) > piAR′(1),
and hence none-make-AR equilibrium does not exist and we conclude that there is a
unique some-make-AR equilibrium.
The analysis of a loss queue with a unique some-make-AR equilibrium is the same
as that of the waiting queue. Thus, Theorem 15 and 16 are valid also for the loss
queue.
Next, we consider the case of having multiple equilibria including both some-make-
AR and none-make-AR. The main difference between the waiting queue the loss queue
is that in the former one there are exactly two some-make-AR equilibrium, while in
the latter one the number of some-make-AR equilibria depends on the distribution
of the demand and can be greater than two.
Under strategy-learning, if there are more than two some-make-AR equilibria, we
cannot know to which equilibrium the game will converge. Thus, Corollary 5 becomes:
Corollary 6. Under strategy-learning with multiple equilibria, the customers’ strategy
convergences to an equilibrium.
Finally, under action-learning, the game can only converge to a none-make-AR
equilibrium. Thus, Theorem 17 is also valid for the loss queue model.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we study a dynamic version of the game where it repeats many times
and customers observe either past actions or strategies. First, we show that under
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strategy-learning, the game converges to an equilibrium and under action-learning the
game can only converge to a none-make-AR equilibrium, if exists.
Next, we analyze the system from the perspective of a provider that charges a
reservation fee and is aiming to maximize her revenue. The analysis shows that if
the provider is risk-averse and chooses a low fee that leads to a unique equilibrium,
sharing information about the actions yields on average greater revenue than sharing
information about the strategies. On the other hand, if the provider is risk-taking
and charges a fee that leads to multiple equilibria, then sharing previous actions may
eventually cause all customers not to make AR. Furthermore, we observe that the way
the belief is constructed impacts the long term outcomes. In some cases, convergence
is guaranteed, while in others, cycling is guaranteed. Thus, we conclude that the
optimal pricing policy depends on the value of δ and whether the customers observes
historical actions or strategies.
Chapter 7
Information Sharing in Waiting Queues
In this chapter, we explore different information sharing policies in an M/M/1 queue
where customers need to decide whether to join the queue or to balk. The literature
on the strategic behavior of customers in queues is traditionally divided into the
classical observable and no-information queues. In the former case, introduced by
Naor (Naor, 1969), customers are informed about the current queue length before
deciding whether to join or balk. In the latter case, introduced by Edelson and
Hilderbrand (Edelson and Hilderbrand, 1975), customers make their decisions based
on statistical information (e.g., the queue parameters). In both cases, customers
behave strategically and join the queue only if their expected waiting cost is smaller
than the reward obtained upon being served.
The goal of this work is to find out whether there are situations where the service
provider can increase her revenue by combining those two frameworks. In particu-
lar, we are interested in studying policies where the provider shares information with
some customers and hides it from others, depending on the actual queue length. We
assume that the service provider has a fixed income from each customer that joins the
queue. Thus, in order to maximize her revenue, the provider should maximize the ef-
fective arrival rate, which is the rate of customers that join the queue, or equivalently,
minimize the idle period of the system.
We compare between the outcomes of the following three policies: (i) always
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inform customers about the queue length; (ii) never inform customers about the
queue length; (iii) inform customers based on a threshold policy in which queue
length information is provided when the queue length is below a specified threshold
and is hidden otherwise. Although the third policy seems intuitive, we formally
prove that, in any setting, either sharing information with all customers or hiding
information from all customers always yields greater expected revenue.
7.1 Model Description
We consider a standard M/M/1 first-come-first-served queueing system. The arrival
rate is a Poisson process with mean λ. The service rate is exponential with mean 1/µ.
We denote ρ = λ/µ to be the maximum load of the queue (recall that customers do
not always join the queue). The cost of each time unit spent at the queue (waiting
and being served) is C. Without loss of generality, we set C = 1. All customers have
the same reward U from service, where U > 1/µ (otherwise, no customer ever joins
the queue).
The standard set-up in all the problems related to strategic behavior in queu-
ing systems (Hassin and Haviv, 2003) is that a new customer decides to join or to
balk depending on his expected sojourn time in the queue and the reward obtained
for service completion. The behavior of a new customer is highly dependent on his
knowledge/information about the current queue length (the queue length at the in-
stant of his arrival). Naturally, a customer will join the queue if and only if the
expected sojourn time (which depends on the information about the queue length
provided to him) is smaller than the reward.
We consider a state-dependent information disclosure policy, such that the control
parameter u is a mapping from the queue length i into the interval [0, 1]. Then, the
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control u(i) for all i = 0, 1, . . . is the probability that the provider gives the information
to an arrival customer when there are i customers in the queue. We only consider
stationary information disclosure policies, i.e. control policies that do not depend
on time. If u(i) = 1, for all i ≥ 0, then it is exactly the (fully) observable model
presented by Naor (Naor, 1969) and if u(i) = 0, for all i ≥ 0, then it is the no-
information model presented by Edelson and Hilderbrand (Edelson and Hilderbrand,
1975). For the rest of the paper, the former information disclosure policy is denoted
u+ and the latter policy is denoted u−.
The provider’s objective is to maximize her revenue, generated through the service
completion. Thus, it aims to maximize the utilization of the queue which is equiva-
lent to minimizing the idle stationary probability of the queue, denoted by pi0. The
optimization problem for the provider is the following:
min
u∈U
piu0 , (7.1)
where U is the set of information disclosure policies/mapping from IN to the interval
[0, 1]. Based on Naor’s model, we know that an informed customer will join if the
queue length is strictly lower than the threshold L = bUµc. An uninformed customer
makes his decision based on his expected sojourn time, denoted by WUI . We assume
that the uninformed customers are aware of the policy used by the provider (this
information can be obtained by trials or via exogenous sources). Thus, an uninformed
customer can evaluate his sojourn time given the system parameters and the provider
policy.
Getting results for all type of information disclosure policies can be complicated.
Therefore, we restrict our analysis to deterministic threshold information disclosure
policies, which make sense in applicative contexts. The principle of revealing the
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queue length when the system is empty and not revealing it when the system is full
seems intuitive. Revealing information when the queue is small should increase the
incoming rate of customers. At the opposite, when the system is overloaded, the
provider may aim not to scare incoming customers and give them the information
about the queue length.
7.2 Equilibrium Analysis of Threshold Policies
In this section, we consider threshold policies, denoted uD(.), for which the provider
informs all customers about the queue length if the actual queue length is below or
equal some threshold D and does not inform them otherwise, that is,
uD(i) =

1 if i ≤ D,
0 if i > D.
(7.2)
Since an uninformed customer knows that the queue length is greater than D,
his expected sojourn time, denoted WUI(D, q), depends on the threshold D and
on the decision of the other uninformed customers, denoted by q, where q ∈ [0, 1]
represents the probability that an uninformed customer joins the queue (all customers
are identical, hence we only consider symmetric strategies). We denote an equilibrium
solution by q∗.
If D ≥ L − 1, uninformed customers will never join the queue as their expected
sojourn times, conditioned on the fact that the queue length is at least L, is necessarily
higher than the reward U (recall that L = bUµc). Thus, the unique equilibrium is q∗ =
0 and a threshold policy with a threshold D ≥ L− 1 is equivalent to the observable
model. Henceforth, we only consider threshold policies with D ∈ {0, 1, .., L − 2}
(which also means that we only consider Uµ ≥ 2). Thus, at equilibrium, all informed
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customers join, while all uninformed customers join with probability q.
The evolution of the queue length process forms a Markov chain with transition
rate λ from state i to state i + 1 if i ≤ D and transition rate λq otherwise. The
transition rate from i to i − 1 is µ for all i > 0. The Markov chain is illustrated in
Figure 7·1. This Markov chain is a birth-death process and the stationary distribution
is given by
pii =

pi0
(
λ
µ
)i
if i ≤ D + 1,
pi0
λiqi−D−1
µi
if i > D + 1,
(7.3)
where pii is the stationary probability that the queue length is equal to i. The idle
stationary probability (i.e., the probability that the queue is empty) as a function of
the threshold D and the joining probability q is given by:
pi0(D, q) =
[
D+1∑
i=0
(
λ
µ
)i
+
∞∑
i=D+2
λiqi−D−1
µi
]−1
=
(λ− µ)(λq − µ)
λ2(−1 + q)(λ/µ)D − λqµ+ µ2 . (7.4)
We define pi(i|i > D) to be the probability that the queue length is i, given that
the queue length is higher than D. Using conditional probability rules, we obtain
pi(i|i > D) = pii∑∞
j=D+1 pij
. (7.5)
The expected sojourn time for an uninformed new customer is
WU(D, q) =
∞∑
i=D+1
i+ 1
µ
pi(i|i > D). (7.6)
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Figure 7·1: A Markov chain representation of the system evolution.
D is the threshold above which customers are not informed about the
queue length and q is the probability that uninformed customers join
the queue. In this example, we assume D < L − 1, that is, informed
customers always join the queue.
Using Eq. (7.3) and Eq. (7.5), we can express the expected sojourn time:
WUI(D, q) =
∑∞
i=D+1 pii
i+1
µ∑∞
i=D+1 pii
=
1 +D
µ
+
1
µ− λq . (7.7)
We next aim to determine the equilibrium strategy q∗ which determines if an unin-
formed customer joins the queue or not. First, we prove the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium.
Lemma 17. A game with a threshold information policy has a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Joining when the queue length is smaller than L and balking otherwise is a
dominant strategy for the informed customers, hence unique. Given the behavior of
the informed customers, we next analyze the behavior of the uninformed customers.
From Eq. (7.7), we deduce that the expected payoff of an uninformed customer
that joins (i.e., U − WUI(D, q)) is decreasing with q, while the expected payoff of
balking (which is zero) does not depend on q. Hence, the two payoff functions either
intersect once or do not intersect. In the latter case, we will have a unique pure equi-
librium where all uninformed customers join (q∗ = 1) or all of them balk (q∗ = 0);
depending on which expected payoff is greater. In the former case, the intersection
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point forms a mixed equilibrium. The fact that the expected payoff of joining is de-
creasing with q, while the expected payoff of balking does not depend on q means that
the game has the ”avoid-the-crowd” property which guarantees that the equilibrium
is unique (see Chapter 1 in (Hassin and Haviv, 2003)).
We start the equilibrium analysis with the simple case ρ < 1 and U > 1/(µ− λ).
In this case, if policy u− is used, then all customers join the queue because the
expected sojourn time when all the customers join is 1/(µ − λ). This outcome is
obviously optimal for the provider and no other policy can outperform it. In any other
case, an equilibrium where all customers join does not exist, namely at equilibrium
q < 1. Henceforth, we focus on that scenario which implies that either the system is
overloaded, that is ρ > 1, or it is underloaded with bounded reward, that is ρ < 1
and U < 1/(µ− λ).
The unique equilibrium might be a pure equilibrium with q∗ = 0 or a mixed equi-
librium with q∗ ∈ (0, 1). In the case of a pure equilibrium, an uninformed customer
knows that the queue length is exactly D+1 (since no uninformed customer joins the
queue), and hence his expected sojourn time is (D+ 2)/µ. In order for q∗it = 0 to be
an equilibrium, an uninformed customer should not be better off by joining, which
implies that
D + 2 ≥ Uµ ≥ bUµc = L. (7.8)
Since we only consider threshold policies with D ≤ L − 2, we deduce that a pure
equilibrium exists only if Uµ = D + 2.
Next, we study the case of having a mixed equilibrium. We derive the fraction
of uninformed customers that join the queue, by using the property that at a mixed
equilibrium, each player must be indifferent between the actions of joining and not
128
joining the queue. Hence, at equilibrium, WUI(D, q∗) = U . By isolating q in Eq. (7.7),
we get
q∗ =
µ(Uµ−D − 2)
λ(Uµ−D − 1) . (7.9)
Since a pure equilibrium with q∗ = 0 only exists when Uµ = D+2, the equation above
captures both the case of a mixed equilibrium and the case of a pure equilibrium.
From Eq. (7.9), we obtain the customers’ equilibrium strategy under an informa-
tion disclosure policy uD adopted by the provider. This result is summarized with
the following theorem.
Theorem 19. If a provider uses the information disclosure policy uD(·), all informed
customers join the queue if the queue length is strictly smaller than L. Uninformed
customers join the queue with probability q∗(D), where
q∗(D) =

0, if D ≥ L− 1,
µ(Uµ−D−2)
λ(Uµ−D−1) , otherwise.
7.3 Comparison of Policies
Using Theorem 19, we next determine the optimal information disclosure policy that
the provider should adopt in order to optimize her revenue. Toward this end, we derive
and compare the idle stationary probabilities, at equilibrium, for the three types of
policies: uD, u− and u+. We ignore the case of D ≥ L− 1 since it is equivalent to the
policy u+.
For deriving the idle stationary probability when a threshold policy uD is used,
we substitute Eq. (7.9) into Eq. (7.4) (i.e., replacing q with q∗). We obtain that at
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equilibrium
pi∗0(D) =
µ− λ
µ− λρD[ρ(Uµ− 1−D)− (Uµ− 2−D)] . (7.10)
When sharing queue length information with all customers, we have, at equilib-
rium, an M/M/1/L queue (i.e., a queue with finite capacity L). This type of queue
was studied in (Taka´cs, 1962) and the idle stationary probability is
pi
u+
0 =
µ− λ
µ− λρbUµc . (7.11)
Finally, when no information is shared with customers there is a unique mixed
equilibrium (recall that U > 1/µ and either ρ > 1 or U < 1/(µ − λ) and, hence,
there is no pure equilibrium in this case). The effective arrival rate is λq∗. Since all
customers are indifferent between joining and balking, the following holds:
U =
1
µ− λq∗ . (7.12)
By isolating q∗ and substituting it in the equation piu−0 = 1− λq∗/µ, we get that
pi
u−
0 =
1
Uµ
. (7.13)
To compare between the performances of the different policies, we distinguish
between the case of an overloaded queue (i.e., ρ > 1) and that of an underloaded
queue (i.e., ρ < 1). Note that the strategic behavior of the customers guarantees that
the effective load is always smaller than one.
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Next, we show that in an overloaded queue, for any value of t and D ∈ {0, 1.., L−
2}, we always have pi∗0(D) > piu+0 . Similarly, in an underloaded queue, pi∗0(D) > piu−0
always holds. Hence:
Theorem 20. Considering the set of deterministic threshold based information dis-
closure policies. To maximize her revenue, a service provider must either use the full
information policy u+ or the empty information policy u−.
Proof. We split the proof into two cases. In the first case, we assume that ρ > 1.
For this case, we will show that pi0(D) > pi
u+
0 . Then, we study the case of ρ < 1, for
which we show that pi0(D) > pi
u−
0 .
From Eq. (7.10) and Eq. (7.11), we deduce that we can prove the first case by
showing that:
ρbUµc > ρD[ρ(Uµ− 1−D)− (Uµ− 2−D)], (7.14)
which is equivalent to showing that
ρbUµc−D > (ρ− 1)(Uµ− 1−D) + 1. (7.15)
We define M = Uµ−D − 1 and observe that
ρbUµc−D > ρUµ−D−1 (7.16)
(recall that ρ > 1). Thus, we can prove our claim by showing that for any M ∈
[Uµ− bUµc+ 1, Uµ− 1] and ρ > 1,
f(M) , ρM − (ρ− 1)M − 1 ≥ 0. (7.17)
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We note that the smallest possible value of M is 1. Since f(1) = 0, showing that
the derivative of f(M) is non-negative will be the final step for proving the first case.
The derivative of f(M) with respect to M is given by
f ′ = ρM ln(ρ)− ρ+ 1. (7.18)
Thus, we need to show that
ln(ρ) ≥ ρ− 1
ρM
. (7.19)
Using the First Mean Value Theorem for Integrals (Halmos, 1953), one can show that
ln(x) ≥ (x− 1)/x, for any x > 0. Thus, Eq. (7.19) holds true and we conclude that
the derivative of f(M) is non-negative.
Next, we prove the other case where ρ < 1. We will show that
µ− λ
µ− λ(ρ)D[ρ(Uµ− 1−D)− (Uµ− 2−D)] >
1
Uµ
, (7.20)
which is equivalent to showing that
U(µ− λ) > 1− ρD+1[ρ(Uµ− 1−D)− (Uµ− 2−D)]. (7.21)
We define N = D + 1 and with some algebra we get that Eq. (7.21) is equivalent to
U(µ− λ) > 1 + ρN [(1− ρ)(Uµ−N)− 1]. (7.22)
Next, we show that the equation above holds true for N = 1, which is the smallest
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possible value of N . We set N = 1 and we get:
Uµ(1− ρ) > 1 + ρ[(1− ρ)(Uµ− 1)− 1]. (7.23)
With some algebra we get that the equation above is equivalent to:
Uµ− 1 > ρ(Uµ− 1). (7.24)
The equation above holds true for any Uµ ≥ 2 and for any ρ < 1. Hence, we showed
that Eq. (7.20) holds true for the case N = 1. Next, we will show that the right hand
side of Eq. (7.22) is non-increasing with N , which will conclude our proof. We define
g(N) = 1 + ρN [(1− ρ)(Uµ−N)− 1]. (7.25)
The derivative of g(N) is
g′ = −ρN ln(ρ) + ρN ln(ρ)(1− ρ)(Uµ−N)− ρN(1− ρ). (7.26)
To show that the derivative is negative, we divide it by ρN and we need to show that:
− ln(ρ) + ln(ρ)(1− ρ)(Uµ−N)− 1 + ρ ≤ 0. (7.27)
Since ln(ρ)(1− ρ) < 0 and (Uµ−N) ≥ 1, the following holds:
ln(ρ)(1− ρ)(Uµ−N) ≤ ln(ρ)(1− ρ). (7.28)
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Figure 7·2: A queue with λ = 9.8, µ = 10 and U = 2. The optimal
policy is u−.
Thus, we can show that Eq. (7.27) holds true by showing that
− ln(ρ) + ln(ρ)(1− ρ)− 1 + ρ ≤ 0. (7.29)
This is equivalent to showing that
ln(ρ) ≥ ρ− 1
ρ
, (7.30)
which holds for any ρ > 0, as we explained before.
Figure 7·2 shows the stationary idle probability when different threshold values
are used in an underloaded queue with λ = 9.8, µ = 10 and U = 2. In this case
L = 20. Thus, we consider threshold policies from 0 to 18. We can see from the
figure that the idle stationary probability of any threshold policy is always greater
than u−. For some threshold values, it is also greater than u+.
In Figure 7·3, we consider an overloaded queue with λ = 11, µ = 10 and U = 2.
In this case, the idle stationary probability of any threshold policy from 0 to 18 is
bounded between u− and u+. This time, the policy that minimizes the idle probability
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Figure 7·3: A queue with λ = 11, µ = 10 and U = 2. The optimal
policy is u+.
is to always inform customers about the queue length, i.e. u+.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, we evaluate different information sharing policies in M/M/1 queue
Our main goal is to find out how customers will behave under a policy which shares
information when the queue length is small and hides it when the queue length is large.
First, we find the equilibria structure and we show that the equilibrium is unique.
Then, we prove that, in order to maximize the throughput, the service provider is
always better off either sharing the information or hiding it.
Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks and Future
Directions
In this dissertation, we introduce advance reservation games: games where customers
must decide whether to reserve a future resource in advance. We study how different
policies and prices impact the behavior of strategic customers and, in turn, the eco-
nomic outcome of the system. We use a mechanism design approach to find policies
and prices that optimize, at equilibrium, the objective of a service provider.
In Chapter 3, we consider a slotted loss system. We first show that, at equilibrium,
either all customers that arrive before some threshold point make AR or none of them
makes AR. Next, we prove the existence of one or more Nash equilibria and find the
range of costs corresponding to each equilibrium. We further show that certain costs
may yield more than one equilibrium. Next, we show that charging a fee from all
customers attempting to reserve a server (including those not granted service) can
only reduce the provider’s revenue from AR fees.
In order for a provider to decide on a proper AR fee, we introduce the concept of
Price of Conservatism (PoC) which corresponds to the ratio of the maximum possible
expected profit to the maximum guaranteed expected profit. A greater PoC indicates
greater potential profit loss if the provider opts to be conservative. We consider the
model where charges are collected only from the customers getting service and assume
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that the demand is Poisson distributed. We show that in a single server system the
equilibrium is unique. Thus, PoC = 1 and the provider experiences no loss. In an
overloaded many-server system where the average demand is λ = αN with α > 1,
the maximum possible expected profit tends to 1, while the maximum guaranteed
expected profit tends to 1 − 1/α as N → ∞. Hence, PoC = α/(α − 1). Thus,
the price of conservatism increases in an unbounded fashion as α approaches 1 from
above. Finally, we show that in an underloaded many-server system, the provider
cannot make profit.
Extensions of the analysis of loss systems to more complex settings (e.g., with
customers differing in their utilities or customers booking more than one server or
slot) and analysis of PoC in other systems represent interesting directions for future
work.
In Chapter 4, we study the impact of different information sharing policies on
customers’ behavior in loss systems. We consider three policies: binary-information
sharing, full-information sharing and partial-information sharing. We find the equi-
librium structure of each game and resort to simulations to find out which policy
maximizes the number of advance reservations. The simulation results indicate that
sharing more information decreases the average number of reservations. Further-
more, we observe that as the reservation cost increases, the impact of the information
sharing policy on the behavior of customers increases.
Several open questions remain about the impact of information on customers’
behavior in systems with advance reservations. One possible extension to this work is
a game with dynamic pricing. For example, the provider can offer a reduced AR fee
or a reduced service fee when the system is almost empty. Another possible extension
is studying the impact of information on systems that allow cancellations. In this
case, the number of available servers can both decrease or increase overtime.
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In Chapter 5, we explore strategic behavior in a waiting queue that let customers
reserve the server in advance. We find the equilibrium structure of this game which
is similar to that in loss systems with no-information sharing. We then focus on the
provider revenue. We show that, at equilibrium, the optimal revenue from AR fees
is determined by the utilization of the queue. If the utilization is smaller than 2/3,
then the optimal fee leads to a unique equilibrium, while a higher fee leads to three
equilibria, including one with no reservation. Once again, we use the PoC metric to
evaluate the ratio between the maximum revenue with risk-averse pricing and with
risk-taking pricing. We show that this ratio increases with the utilization. That is,
as the system gets busier, the provider loses more by being risk-averse.
Studying advance reservations in other types of waiting queues represents an in-
teresting area for future research. Studying the impact of information sharing in
waiting queues could be another interesting area of research. For example, one can
study a version of the game where before deciding whether to make AR or not, the
customers know what will be their waiting times if making AR.
In Chapter 6, we study a dynamic version of AR games. Our goal is to shed light
on the long-term behavior of customers. We explore two versions of best response
dynamics. In one version, customers observe previous strategies. In this version,
convergence to equilibrium is guaranteed. If multiple equilibria exist, then the game
converges to either a none-make-AR equilibrium or to a some-make-AR equilibrium.
The initial belief determines to which equilibrium the system will converge. In the
second version, customers observe past actions rather than strategies. In this case,
the game can only converge to a none-make-AR equilibrium (if it exists). Thus, if
the provider’s interest is that customers make reservations, then she should design
the AR mechanism such that a none-make-AR equilibrium does not exist.
Future work includes studying different learning rules, such as fictitious play or
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reinforcement learning. Another direction is to apply best response dynamic on AR
games with full-information sharing.
In Chapter 7, we study the impact of information sharing in M/M/1 queues, where
customers decide whether to join or balk. We seek to find out whether informing
customers about the queue length when it is small and hiding this information when
it is large can be beneficial for a provider aiming to maximize her revenue. We prove
that such policy is never optimal. That is, a provider is better off by either always
sharing information or always hiding it. Future work could investigate more complex
information sharing policies. For example, sharing or hiding the information in a
probabilistic fashion.
In conclusion, in this dissertation, we develop a framework that helps us to bet-
ter understand the strategic behavior of customers in a system that allows advance
reservations. We use this framework to analyze the impact of pricing, charging, and
information sharing policies on the economic equilibria of the system and on its dy-
namic behavior. The analysis yields several insights that should prove useful to a
service provider designing a system that allows advance reservations.
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